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GOLD is a hardy  perennial.  It provides  a psychological  and material  safe 
haven for people all around  the world, and its invocation  still produces 
deep-seated visceral reactions in many. It is not surprising,  then, that 
when economic conditions  are unfavorable,  proposals  to strengthen  the 
role of gold in the monetary  system find an audience much wider than 
the "gold bugs" who have always seen the demise of the gold standard 
as the negative  turning  point in Western  civilization. 
The early 1980s  is one of these periods. A number  of proposals  have 
been put forward  to reinstitute some monetary  role for gold, varying 
from window dressing to a full-fledged  revival of the gold standard. 
These proposals are being treated with a seriousness that would have 
been astonishing  twenty, ten, or even five years ago. An official  exami- 
nation  of the subject was undertaken  by the Gold Commission,  which 
was established  by President  Reagan  in June 1981  and  issued its conten- 
tious report in March 1982;  and several bills have been submitted  to 
Congress  with the objective of reviving  a monetary  role for gold.  I 
1. Establishment  of the Gold Commission  was not at President  Reagan's  initiative, 
however.  He was responding  to a statutory  requirement  to study U.S. policy on the role 
of gold in the domestic and international  monetary  systems. In 1980  President  Carter 
signed  an act to increase  U.S. quotas  at the International  Monetary  Fund, to which this 
requirement  had  been added  as a rider  by Senator  Jesse Helms. 
With much disagreement  among its members,  the Gold Commission  recommended 
against  restoration  of any formal  monetary  role  for gold. In its one positive  recommenda- 
tion, the majority  of the commission  favored issuance of gold coins by the U.S. Mint, 
denominated  by weight, sold at market  prices, and exempt from capital  gains taxation. 
See Report  to Congress  of  the Commission  on  the Role  of Gold in the Domestic  and 
International Monetary Systems  (Government Printing Office,  1982). 
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This  paper  first  offers a review, necessarily  brief,  of the heyday  of the 
historical  gold standard,  focusing  on those features  that  today  are  alleged 
to be the advantages  of a gold standard.  The paper then provides an 
examination  of the leading proposals for reviving gold at the present 
time  and  addresses  problems  with and  consequences  of their  implemen- 
tation. Finally, since interest  in reviving  gold lies primarily  in a desire  to 
eliminate  inflation  and  preserve  a noninflationary  environment-a point 
on which  the historical  gold standard  offers  little  comfort-a final  section 
of the paper  considers  other  proposals  for commodity  standards  that  go 
beyond reliance  on the single commodity,  gold, to stabilize  the general 
level of prices. 
Before  turning  to the history  of the gold standard,  however, I examine 
briefly the  stated and sometimes implicit objectives of  those  who 
advocate an important  monetary  role for gold. The primary  emphasis, 
as noted above, is the restoration  and maintenance  of price stability;  it 
is this motive, I believe, that gives gold such wide support. If the 
monetary side of the economy is somehow restrained by gold, the 
argument  runs, the economy cannot  inflate  and  prices will be stabilized. 
That is  ultimately an empirical question, which can be  addressed 
scientifically.  But there seem to be other motivations  as well. Some see 
restoration  of gold as a way to reestablish  fixed exchange rates among 
major  currencies. To accomplish this result, all the relevant countries 
would have to restore a monetary  role to gold in the required  fashion. 
Action by the United States alone would not accomplish  this objective; 
currencies  could float  against  the U.S. dollar  even if it were tied to gold. 
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, many advocates want 
greater automaticity in management.  of the economy, and especially 
monetary  policy, as an objective in its own right  even if the automaticity 
results in greater  economic instability. Such underlying  philosophical 
differences  in preferences  do not readily  lend themselves to economic 
or other  empirical  analysis, although  they derive  in part  from  a supposed 
association of large government discretion in economic (and other) 
management  with a loss of individual  freedom.  I am  not aware,  however, 
that this last association has been made in arguing  for a return  by the 
United States to a gold standard,  at least since Americans  have once 
again  been permitted  to buy and sell gold freely.2  But to the extent that 
2.  The point was made explicitly  twenty  years ago by Arthur Kemp,  however,  who 
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such philosophical views  govern, historical evidence on  economic 
performance  under  the gold standard  is of secondary  importance,  if that. 
It is to the historical  record, nonetheless, that I now turn. 
History of the Gold Standard 
While  gold  has been used as a store  of value  and  as a means  of payment 
since ancient times, the international  gold standard  proper  dates only 
from  the 1870s.3  It lasted until 1914,  and then had a brief revival in the 
late 1920s.  Britain,  it is true, was on a full legal  gold standard  from 1816, 
and on a de facto gold standard  after 1717,  when Sir Isaac Newton, by 
then  a famous  personage  and  Master  of the Mint,  did  not depreciate  gold 
enough when he set the official silver price of the gold guinea at 21 
shillings and thereby inadvertently  continued to drive the newly re- 
minted  full-bodied  silver coins out of Britain-an illustration  of Gresh- 
am'  s law-leaving  only worn silver coins to circulate as means of 
payment  along with the overvalued  gold coins. This error  in judgment 
established the gold standard in practice; it was codified into law 
following  the Napoleonic  wars  in what  became  in the nineteenth  century 
the world's  leading  economic  and  military  power.  That  in  turn  influenced 
others,  especially Germany  and  later  Japan,  to turn  to the gold standard, 
which was seen as part  of the syndrome  of British  success. So the gold 
standard  as it has come down  to us in textbooks,  though  not  the monetary 
use of gold, was in a sense an accident  of history. 
Until the late nineteenth  century  most countries  were on a bimetallic 
standard,  interspersed  with occasional periods of inconvertible  paper 
(as in the United States in the 1780s  and  the 1862-78  period,  or in Britain 
from 1797  to 1821).  Some countries,  such as China  and  Mexico, were on 
silver alone and remained  so into the twentieth century. Holland and 
with  the opportunity  to escape  from  political  tyranny  throughout  history.  See Kemp,  "The 
Gold Standard:  A Reappraisal,"  in Leland B. Yeager, ed., In Search of a Monetary 
Constitution  (Harvard  University  Press, 1962),  pp. 137-54, especially pp. 152-53. This 
volume,  incidentally,  offers  an  excellent  sampling  of the debate  twenty  years  ago  on sound 
versus  unsound  money and  the desirable  degree  of discretion  to leave in the hands  of the 
monetary  authorities-with a heavy majority  of the contributors  being against  much, if 
any, discretion. 
3. The oldest known  gold coins date from the sixth century  B.C. See Brian  Kettell, 
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Belgium  even switched from bimetallism  to silver alone in 1850  on the 
grounds  (following  the California  gold discoveries in 1848)  that  gold was 
too unstable  to provide the basis for the currency. The United States 
adopted  a de facto gold standard  with resumption  of specie payment  on 
the Civil War  greenbacks  in 1879  (some would say it was formal, since 
the standard  silver  dollar  was dropped  from  the coinage in the "crime  of 
1873");  it moved formally  with the Gold Standard  Act of 1900. 
What were the features of this gold standard?  Arthur  Bloomfield, 
perhaps  the leading  American  authority  on the gold standard,  character- 
ized it in this way: "The national  monetary  unit  was defined  in terms of 
a given quantity  of gold; the central  bank  or treasury  stood ready  to buy 
and  sell gold at the resulting  fixed  price  in  terms  of the national  currency; 
gold was freely coined and gold coins formed a significant  part of the 
circulating  medium;  and gold could be freely exported  and imported."4 
These conditions in turn implied nearly fixed exchange rates between 
the currencies  of countries  on the gold standard,  assured  by the possi- 
bility of profitable  gold arbitrage  whenever exchange rates reached  the 
gold export or import  points, determined  by mint charges (if any) and 
the costs of shipping  gold.5 
How did this system fare in terms of economic performance?  The 
idealized gold standard  as it appears in textbooks conveys a sense of 
automaticity  and stability-a  self-correcting  mechanism  with minimum 
human  intervention,  which assured  rough  stability  of prices and  balance 
in international  payments. 
The actual gold standard  could hardly have been further  from this 
representation.  As noted above, the major  countries  of the world were 
on the gold standard  proper only from the 1870s to 1914, and briefly 
between the two world wars. The first period went down in history as 
the Great Depression-until,  that is, the second period came along to 
exceed it in depth  and severity. 
With a dose of nostalgia, the gold standard  period looks somewhat 
4. Arthur  I. Bloomfield,  "Gold  Standard,"  in Douglas  Greenwald,  ed., Encyclopedia 
of Economics  (McGraw-Hill,  1981), p. 452. 
5. Variations  in exchange  rates  were  thus  influenced  by the gradual  decline  in shipping 
costs, by interest rates, and by changes in mint charges. In the 1880s the range for 
fluctuation  in the pound-dollar  rate  of exchange  was about 1.3 percent;  that between  the 
British pound and the French franc was about 0.8 percent. See Oskar Morgenstern, 
International  Financial  Transactions  and Business  Cycles (Princeton University  Press, 
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Table  1.  Economic  Variables  in the United  States  and  the United  Kingdom  under 
the Gold Standard  and  since  World  War  II 
United Kingdom  United States 
Gold  Gold 
standard,  Postwar,  standard,  Postwar, 
Measure  1870-1913  1946-79  1879-1913  1946-79 
Average annual change 
in wholesale  prices 
(percent)a  -  0.7  5.6  0.1  2.8 
Standard deviation  of 
price change (percent)b  4.6  6.2c  5.4  4.8c 
Average annual growth in 
real per capita income 
(percent)  1.4  2.4  1.9  2.1 
Coefficient of variation 
of annual percentage 
changes in real per 
capita income  (ratio)d  2.5  1.4  3.5  1.6 
Average unemployment 
rate  (percent)  4.3e  2.5  6.81  5.0 
Average annual growth 
in money  supply (per- 
cent)a  1.5  5.9  6.1  5.7 
Coefficient of variation 
of growth in money 
supply  (ratio)d  1.6  1.0  0.8  0.5 
Sources:  Michael  David  Bordo,  "The  Classical  Gold  Standard:  Some  Lessons  for Today,"  Review  of  the  St. 
Loutis Federal  Reserve  Bank,  vol.  63  (May  1981), p.  14, and calculations  from George  F.  Warren and  Frank A. 
Pearson,  Gold  and  Prices  (Wiley,  1935), pp.  13-14,  87;  B.  R.  Mitchell,  Abstract  of  British  Historical  Statistics 
(Cambridge University  Press,  1971), pp. 367-68;  Council of Economic  Advisers,  Ecotnomic Report of the Presidetnt, 
Januiary 1982; and International Monetary Fund,  International  Fitnancial Statistics,  various  issues. 
a.  Calculated as the time coefficient  from a regression  of the log of the variable on a time trend. 
b.  Calculated as the standard error of estimate  of the fitted equation In P,  =  a In P,_ 1, where P, is the wholesale 
price index in year t. 
c.  1949-79. 
d.  Calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation  of annual percentage  changes  to their mean. 
e.  1888-1913. 
f.  1890-1913. 
better  to us than it did to contemporaries.  Economic growth  during  the 
late nineteenth century was very respectable, although  in per capita 
terms  it falls short  of the 2. 1  percent  achieved  in the United  States  during 
the thirty years between 1950  and 1980. Variability  in income growth 
was substantially higher under the gold standard than it was after 
World  War  II, and  average  unemployment  was also considerably  higher 
(see table 1). Moreover, the last third  of the nineteenth  century was a 
period  of unprecedented  controversy  over the monetary  standard  in the 
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rate  for the Civil  War  greenbacks,  then over the monetary  role of silver. 
Legislation  was almost  constantly  before Congress  to change  monetary 
relations. Some of the legislation passed into law. The Bland-Allison 
Act of 1878  authorized  the U.S. Department  of the Treasury  to buy $2 
to $4 million  in silver  each month,  and  the Sherman  Silver  Purchase  Act 
of 1890  raised  this figure  to nearly  $6 million  and made  the purchases  of 
nearly  all U.S. output  obligatory.  The Silver  Purchase  Act was repealed 
in 1893  following  a sharp  decline in the world  price of silver and a sharp 
increase  in calls on gold at the Treasury.  A National  Monetary  Commis- 
sion was established following the "panic of 1907," and the Federal 
Reserve Act passed in 1913. 
The year 1896 saw the only U.S. presidential  campaign  devoted to 
the issue of the monetary  standard,  following  William  Jennings  Bryan's 
nomination  on the basis of his famous "cross of gold" speech. Most of 
the attempts  to alter  monetary  relations  and  to dislodge  the United  States 
from  a gold standard  failed. But the point is that the issue was a source 
of continual  turmoil  and  uncertainty,  not serene stability.6 
There was less monetary  debate in Britain  during  this period-that 
had taken place in  1815-20, surrounding  the resumption of  specie 
payment  after the Napoleonic wars. But even Britain  was not immune 
from concerns about the monetary system, and established the Royal 
Commission  on the Depression of Trade and Industry  in 1886  and the 
Gold and Silver Commission  in 1887,  to both of which Alfred  Marshall 
gave important  testimony. There  were international  conferences on the 
monetary  standard  (mainly  an effort to preserve bimetallism)  in 1878, 
1881,  and 1892,  although  Britain  attended  without  enthusiasm. 
So much for the political agitation. What about economic develop- 
ments? The late nineteenth century was no doubt a period of rapid 
growth,  especially in manufacturing.  There  was a sharp  decline in both 
inland  and  ocean  transportation  costs and  a great  increase  in  international 
trade. But it was  also a  period of  great distress, with large-scale 
emigration  from Europe, and one in which there was great labor strife 
and  formation  of labor  unions.7 
6. An excellent discussion  of this period,  brief  but well-documented,  can be found  in 
Arthur  Nussbaum,  A Histoty of the Dollar  (Columbia  University  Press, 1957). 
7.  During  the 1880s, for instance, no less than 80 percent of the natural  increase 
in British population  emigrated, and one-third of the natural  increase in Germany. 
Calculated  from B.  R.  Mitchell,  European  Historical  Statistics,  1750-1970  (Columbia 
University  Press, 1975),  pp. 20, 24, 138, 139. Richard N.  Coover  7 
PRICE  MOVEMENTS 
Price stability  was not attained,  either in the short  run or in the long 
run,  either  during  the period  of the gold standard  proper  or over a longer 
period  during  which gold held dominant  influence.  In fact, in the United 
States short-run  variations  in wholesale prices were higher  during  the 
prewar gold standard  period than from 1949 to  1979. The standard 
deviation  of annual  movements in prices was 5.4 percent in the earlier 
period  and only 4.8 percent  in the latter  period  (see table 1).8  It could be 
argued that such short-run variations are of little economic conse- 
quence-it  is the long-run  trend  that  is important  for contracts  and  other 
economic  transactions,  and  the trend  was upward  in the postwar  period. 
However, current  efforts  to explain  the costs of inflation  focus inter  alia 
on the confusion of signals that is introduced  when the general  level of 
prices  is changing,  so that  buyers  and  sellers,  with  imperfect  information, 
cannot clearly distinguish  the relative  price movements  that are impor- 
tant  for resource  allocation.  This argument  applies  with  even more  force 
to short-term  fluctuations  in price levels than  to long-term  movements. 
However, the gold standard  did not assure price stability  in the long 
run  either. Price "stability" in the sense of a return  to earlier  levels of 
prices was obtained  over longer  periods  only by judicious choice of the 
years for comparison.  If one chooses 1822, 1856, 1877, late 1915, and 
1931, for instance, the U.S.  wholesale price level  indeed appears 
unchanged.  But  between  these dates  there  were great  swells and  troughs 
(see figure  1). 
Table 2 shows cumulative price movements from peak to trough 
(excluding  the U.S. Civil  War)  in four  countries  during  the century  from 
1816  to 1913.  Although  each country  had its distinctive national  devel- 
opments, the parallelism  among price movements is striking.9  Prices 
8. These standard  deviations  are calculated  as the standard  error  of estimate  of the 
fitted  equation,  In  P, =  a In  P,  , where P, is the wholesale price index in year t. This 
statistic  for Britain  showed  a higher  standard  error  for the more  recent  period  than  for the 
gold  standard  era, 6.2 percent  versus  4.6 percent.  Moreover,  if price  changes  are  measured 
over  five-year  intervals,  as from  ln P, = b ln  P,5,  the standard  error  is higher  in the more 
recent  period  for both the United States and Britain.  The standard  errors  for the United 
States  and  Britain,  respectively,  are 13.7  and 11.3  percent  in 1884-1913  and  21.0 and  37.8 
percent  in 1953-79. 
9. The indexes are dominated  by tradable  goods, so under  fixed exchange  rates, and 
except  for changes  in import  tariffs,  that  would  ensure  close correspondence  in the latter 
part  of the period  when  transport  costs were low. 00 
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Table 2.  Wholesale  Price Indexes for the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany,  and France, Selected Years, 1816-1913 
Year and period  United States  United Kingdom  Germany  France 
Indexes (1913  =  100) 
1816  150  147  94  143 
1849  82  86  67  94 
1873  137  130  114  122 
1896  64  72  69  69 
1913  100  100  100  100 
Changes (in percent) 
1816-49  -  45  -  41  -  29  -  33 
1849-73  67  51  70  30 
1873-96  -  53  -  45  -  40  -  45 
1896-1913  56  39  45  45 
Sources:  Data for the United  States and the United  Kingdom are from Warren and Pearson,  Gold ahid Prices,  pp. 
87-88; data for Germany and France  are from B.  R. Mitchell,  Eiuropeani  Historical  Statistics,  1750-1970  (Columbia 
University  Press,  1975), pp. 736-39. 
declined  30 to 45 percent  from  the highs  of the post-Napoleonic  period, 
rose about  50  percent  until  the general  establishment  of the gold standard 
in the 1870s,  fell about  50 percent  again  until  the gold discoveries of the 
late 1890s, then rose sharply  in the two decades before World  War I. 
This is hardly  a pattern  of stability, even long-term  stability, although 
there were prolonged  periods of price decline as well as of price rise. 
But the full swings are so long in duration-forty to sixty years-that 
they can hardly  have offered  much  comfort  for any but the longest term 
financial  contracts, and then only because of the accidents of war or 
discovery. 
Although we know that the price level of 1822, during  a period of 
secular price decline, would be restored by  1856, a period of price 
increase,  and  again  by 1877,  a period  of decline, did the contemporaries 
know it? That is what is relevant. Several points can be made on this 
score, although  some puzzles remain.  Indeed, even the idea of a price 
index was in its infancy. Laspeyres, whose name is still used on base- 
weighted  index numbers,  published  his ideas in 1864.  At about  the same 
time, Stanley  Jevons (credited  by Irving  Fisher  as the originator  of index 
numbers)  was making  the distinction  between short-term  and  long-term 
fluctuations  in the general  level of prices. The idea of a general  level of 
prices had been around for a long time, but refinement  and regular 10  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
measurement  had  not yet occurred.  Jevons was certainly  aware  of them, 
and  of their  reciprocal,  the value of gold, when he raised  the question  in 
1875  of whether  "having  regard  to these extreme changes in the values 
of the precious  metals, it is desirable  to employ them as the standard  of 
value  in long lasting  contracts."  '0  And in his testimony  before  the Royal 
Commission  on the Depression of Trade and Industry  in 1886, Alfred 
Marshall  proposed  that  the government  "should  publish  tables showing 
as closely as may be the changes in the purchasing  power of gold, and 
should  facilitate  contracts  for payments  to be made in terms of units of 
fixed purchasing  power." In the same evidence Marshall  alludes to a 
"search  for a better  and  more  stable  currency  than  our  present."  " From 
these remarks  one may infer that there was not a generally accepted 
index  of the  purchasing  power  of (gold)  money,  and  that  contracts  written 
in money  terms  were not stable  in terms  of purchasing  power  over goods 
other than gold, presumably  even after allowing  for adjustments  in the 
interest  rate  (to which Marshall  does not allude). 
What is perhaps more to the point, however, is that the financial 
community-both borrowers  and lenders-apparently thought  that the 
long-term  price level was roughly  stable  from  its present  level, adjusted 
slightly  on the basis of recent  past experience,  but  they were continually 
fooled. Long-term  interest rates in the United States, as measured  by 
railway  bonds  with  original  maturities  from  twenty  to one hundred  years, 
fell steadily  from  9.5 percent in 1857  (the first year of the series), to 6.6 
percent in 1877,  4.3 percent in 1896, and 3.8 percent (the low point) in 
1902,  rising  again  to 4.3 percent  in 1913.  12 This pattern  of secular  decline 
followed by secular rise is roughly  the same as that of the price level, 
which implies  that real interest  rates on forward-looking  contracts  such 
as bonds showed great  swings. Ex post, creditors  gained  at the expense 
of debtors in the fourth quarter  of the nineteenth  century (the rise of 
populism  and strong  antibank  feeling during  that period shows that the 
10.  W. Stanley Jevons,  Money and the Mechanism of Exchange  (D. Appleton,  1875), 
p. 326. His  "Serious  Fall in the Value  of Gold Ascertained,  and Its Social  Effects  Set 
Forth" appeared in 1863 and his "Variation of Prices" in 1865. 
11.  Official Papers by Alfred Marshall (London: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 10, 15. 
12.  Frederick R. Macaulay,  The Movement of Interest Rates,  Bond  Yields and Stock 
Prices in the United States since 1856 (National Bureau of Economic Research,  1938), pp. 
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debtors  were very much aware of it) and lost in the first quarter  of the 
twentieth  century. Real ex post rates of return  on twenty-year  bonds 
purchased in 1872 (a price peak) and held until maturity  were 10.4 
percent, compared  with a nominal  yield of 7.5 percent; similar  bonds 
purchased  in 1896  (a secular  price  trough)  and  held  until  maturity  yielded 
only 1.2 percent in real terms, compared  with a nominal  yield of 4.3 
percent  (figure  2). 
Yields  on British  consols followed  roughly  the same  pattern  as prices; 
they declined gradually  from a postresumption  high of 4.42 percent 
in 1820 to a low of 3.02 percent in 1852, rose to a local high of 3.41 
percent  in 1866,  declined gradually  and slowly to a low of 2.45 percent 
in 1897, then rose to 3.39 percent in 1913 (and up to 4.43 percent in 
1925,  when the gold standard  was resumed  in Britain).  13 Calculations  of 
real rates of return  are more arbitrary  for perpetuals, but for holding 
periods  of twenty to twenty-five  years, as in the United  States, real  rates 
of return  varied much more than nominal  rates of return.  It is thus not 
true, as is sometimes  claimed,  that a gold-based  unit of account  offers a 
stable basis for long-term  contracts and "eliminates entirely windfall 
losses and windfall  gains among  debtors  and creditors."  14 Variations  in 
real short-term  interest rates were even greater  over the period 1879- 
1913,  moving  from a high of 11.5 percent (May 1891  to May 1894)  to a 
low of - 2.3 percent  (June 1897  to November 1900).  15 
If the relevant  public really expected the long-term  price level to be 
stable, long-term  interest  rates should  be negatively correlated  with the 
price  level, high  levels giving  rise to expectations  of a subsequent  fall in 
prices, which would be reflected in a lowering of nominal long-term 
interest rates; the reverse effect would take hold when the price level 
was low relatively  to historical  levels. Instead, long-term  interest  rates 
are positively correlated  with the price level, both in Britain  and in the 
13. See George  F. Warren  and Frank  A. Pearson,  Gold and Prices (Wiley, 1935),  p. 
403. 
14. Jude  Wanniski,  Business Week,  December  7, 1981,  p. 27. 
15. See Lawrence  H. Summers,  "The Non-Adjustment  of Nominal  Interest  Rates:  A 
Study  of the Fisher  Effect," Working  Paper  836  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
1982),  p. 18. Summers  averages  real  commercial  paper  rates  over the economic  cycles as 
defined  by the NBER, using monthly  Warren  and Pearson  wholesale prices to deflate 
nominal  interest  rates. In a variety  of statistical  tests, he finds  no statistically  significant 
effect  of inflation  on interest  rates. 12  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Figure 2.  U.S. Wholesale Prices, Long-Term  Interest Rates, and Long-Term  Real 
Interest Rates for a Twenty-Year  Holding Period, 1873-1914a 
Interest rate (percent per year)  Wholesale price  level  (index,  1910-14  =  100) 
11;. 
A 
10  \ 
9  1  \  Real  interest rate 
8 -  130 
7  -  .  120 
6  \ 
-  \Nominal  long-term interest  rate  110 
-2 
4-1  90 
1880  1890  1900  1910 
Sources:  Warren and Pearson,  Gold and Prices,  pp.  13-14; and Frederick R. Macaulay,  Thle  Mov em7ent  cf inlterest 
Rates,  Bond Yields and Stock Prices  in the United States  since 1856 (National  Bureau of Economic  Research,  1938), 
pp. A 108-A 109. 
a.  The nominal interest rate is the yield on American railroad bonds. 
United  States. The data suggest  that  the public  did not correctly  foresee 
the long-term  price changes that were to take place, and they adjusted 
their  expectations  (as reflected  in interest  rates)  only slowly to the price 
movements that had actually taken place.'6 Nominal interest rates, in 
16.  Keynes  called the movement  of long-term interest rates in parallel with prices the 
"Gibson paradox,"  after a person who made the observation  and tried unsuccessfully  to 
explain it in the 1920s. Keynes'  own explanation ran in terms of a tendency  of the market 
rate  of  interest  to  lag behind  changes  in the  natural rate of interest-that  is,  the rate 
required to equate  savings  with investment,  with the consequence  that a decline  in the Richard N.  Cooper  13 
other words, did not adjust  adequately  to correct for rates of inflation; 
on the contrary,  on balance they adjusted  with such long lags that the 
correction  turned  out to be perverse. 
In  view of another  claim  that  is sometimes  made  for the gold standard, 
that it is conducive to long-term  contracts (British consols being the 
extreme  manifestation  of long maturities),  it is worth  noting  that, while 
high-quality  bonds could typically be floated in the United States for 
twenty-five  or thirty or sometimes even one hundred  years, mortgage 
loans in the nineteenth century were typically very short, averaging 
about  four years for farm  mortgages.  17 
INCREASE  IN  MONETARY  GOLD  SUPPLIES 
Prices were not stable under  the gold standard  in part-but  only in 
part-because the stock of gold varied  substantially  in its rate  of growth. 
The general level of prices in terms of currency  can be written as a 
product  of the currency  price of gold and the terms of trade between 
gold and commodities: $/goods =  ($/gold)(gold/goods).  Under a gold 
standard  the currency price of gold is fixed (indeed, the currency is 
defined  in terms of gold). The price level will be stable only insofar as 
the terms of trade  between gold and other goods is stable. But stability 
in the terms  of trade  is unlikely  in the presence of substantial  variations 
in the supply of gold, except insofar  as the public's demand  for gold is 
perfectly  elastic in terms of other goods-a  claim even nonmonetarists 
would  decline to make. 
Variations in the growth in monetary gold were due mainly to 
fluctuations  in gold production,  but to some extent also to variations  in 
nonmonetary  demand  for gold. As a consequence of new production 
from California  and Australia, the stock of monetary gold doubled 
natural  rate  would  lead  to a depression  in  economic  activity  and  a decline  in  prices,  whereas 
a rise in the natural  rate (ahead  of the market  rate)  would  lead to a long-term  investment 
boom  and  a secular  rise in prices. He attributed  more  of the great  secular  swings  in prices 
to this factor than to purely  monetary  factors, on the grounds  that basically, through  a 
variety  of channels,  the supply  of money (or  efficiency  in its use) responds  to the demand 
for it. See John  Maynard  Keynes, A Treatise  on Money  (London:  Macmillan,  1930),  vol. 
2, pp. 198-208. 
17. Based on specific questions in the 1890  census, reported  in Douglass C. North, 
Growth and Welfare in the American Past (Prentice-Hall,  1966), p. 141. 14  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Table 3.  World Gold Output and Monetary Stocksa 
Millions of fine ounces 
Monetaty  gold  in stock 
Additions  to monetaly  End-of period 
Period  Production  gold  stock  Percent  increase  stock 
1493-1600  23.6  n.a.  ... 
1601-1700  29.3  n.a.  ...  ... 
1701-1800  61.1  n.a.  n.a.  39 
1801-39  19.8  7  18  46 
1840-49  14.7  6  13  52 
1850-59  60.4  46  88  98 
1860-69  61.0  30  30  128 
1870-79  54.6  22  17  150 
1880-89  51.4  17  11  167 
1890-99  95.1  59  35  226 
1900-09  173.2  104  46  330 
1910-19  213.8  122  37  452 
1920-29  180.5  98  22  550 
1930-39  256.5  b  205  37  755 
1940-49  260. lb  228  30  983 
1950-59  268.3b  166  17  1149 
1960-69  388.2b  30  3  1179 
1970-79  339.2b  -  49  -4  1130 
1980  29.2b  4  . . .  1134 
Sources:  Data for  1493-1929  were  computed  from Warren and Pearson,  Gold atid Prices,  pp.  92-93,  121,  125. 
Gold production data for  1930-66  are from Fred Hirsch,  "Influences  on Gold Production,"  Itntertnatiotnal  Motnetaty 
Fintid  Sta-ff Papers,  vol.  15 (November  1968), p.  486; since  1967 from  Bank for international  Settlements,  Antnulial 
Report, various  issues.  Data on  monetary  gold  after  1930 are from estimates  by  the  International Monetary  Fund 
and from IMF, Itnternationial  Finiancial Statistics,  various issues. 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  The dollar value  before  1933 can  be  calculated  by  multiplying  by  $20.67;  1934-68,  by $35.  For  metric tons, 
divide by 32,151. 
b.  Excluding the Soviet  Union. 
between 1848 and 1859, after having shown negligible growth in the 
preceding  two decades.  18 It took until 1895  to double  again-a  period  of 
thirty-six  years-whereupon  it again doubled in the nineteen years to 
1914  as a result of sharp  increases in gold production  in South Africa, 
Canada,  and  Alaska  during  the late 1890s  (which  was partly  the result  of 
new discoveries, partly the result of improved  extractive techniques). 
Table  3 shows world  gold production  (and  also in figure  3), increases in 
18. MIT  President  Francis  Walker  called  it  "the  greatest  financial  storm  of  two 
centuries."  See Francis A. Walker, International Bimetallism (Henry Holt,  1897), p. 129. 
Walker's little book  gives  an excellent  history  of  the  monetary  use  of  metals  and,  in 
particular, of the interaction between  silver and gold. Richard N.  Cooper  15 
Figure 3.  World Gold Production, 1805-1980 
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Sources:  Same as table 3. 
monetary  gold, and estimated monetary  gold stocks. Although major 
developments do not always appear  at the beginning  of each decade, 
table 3 clearly shows the great variation  in additions  to monetary  gold 
stocks over the decades, from a low of 11  percent during  the 1880s  to a 
high of 88 percent during  the 1850s. The clear correlation  with price 
movements during the century led a number of observers-Cassels, 
Kitchin,  Keynes, Warren  and  Pearson,  among  others-to  generalize  the 
relation.  Warren  and Pearson, for instance, argue  that, on the basis of 
history  during  the preceding  century, prices rose whenever the rate of 
growth  in monetary  gold exceeded the rate of growth  of total output  (or 
physical  production,  as they call it), and  fell whenever  the growth  in gold 
fell short of the growth in production. The key rate of growth was 16  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
reckoned by many authors to be between 2.5 and 3 percent. If gold 
stocks did not increase  this rapidly,  prices were bound  to fall.  19 
The general  relation  between the quantity  of money and the level of 
prices had been part of background  knowledge at least since David 
Hume's famous parable  in 1752  involving  a hypothetical  destruction  of 
four-fifths  of England's  money supply, leading  to a decline in prices and 
an improvement  in the balance of trade. With this "model" of the 
economic system in mind, the tenfold increase in annual new gold 
supplies that took place between the late 1830s  and the mid-1850s  and 
the not quite so sharp increase in the decade spanning  the turn of the 
century should have affected prices through  expectations, in the cur- 
rently voguish rational  expectations view of the world. Yet the impact 
on prices of these sharp  increases in gold production  (which, as noted, 
also represented  a sharp  increase  in the rate of growth  of monetary  gold 
stocks) was more gradual,  delayed, and spread over a long period of 
time. Whereas world monetary  gold stocks grew 90 percent between 
1849  and 1859,  and 45 percent  between 1895  and 1905,  wholesale prices 
in the United States rose only 24 percent  and 29 percent  during  the two 
periods,  respectively,  and  prices  in Britain  rose 28  percent  and 16  percent 
in the same two periods.20  Warren  and Pearson  reckon  a delay of about 
thirteen  years before the full impact  of increased  gold supplies  is felt on 
prices.21  Why  the prolonged  period  of adjustment?  Several  explanations 
are  possible. First, the public  may not have known  the full magnitude  of 
the increases. That  is almost  certainly  true, since statistical  information 
was much scarcer  then than  it is today. But the public  might  just as well 
have overestimated  the true extent of the increase, given the enormous 
publicity and excitement that attended the gold discoveries in each 
period. 
Second, based on quantity theory reasoning it is the total money 
supply  that  counts, not a single  component  of it. Allowance  for monetary 
silver and bank notes reduces the rate of increase in money brought 
about by the new gold supplies, but not by enough to bring  the figures 
into correspondence.22  This is especially true for Britain,  where silver 
19.  See Warren and Pearson, Gold and Prices,  pp. 94-97. 
20.  U.S.  prices rose more sharply between  1849 and 1855-by  36 percent-and  then 
fell again. 
21.  Warren and Pearson, Gold and Prices,  p. 132. 
22.  Laughlin reckons gold to be 72 percent of the British money supply (gold, silver, Richard N.  Cooner  17 
coins  were  of relatively  minor  importance;  but  they  were  also  temporarily 
of less importance  in the United States during  the 1840s, full-weight 
coins having been largely exported as a result of the Currency  Act of 
1834.  The allowance  for bank deposits takes us further  from the expla- 
nation  in the later  period;  as shown below, they grew more  rapidly  than 
gold. But such deposits should perhaps not be counted because, like 
credit  cards  today, they were not yet recognized  as money. 
Third,  the  public  may  have  believed,  contrary  to the  Hume  hypothesis, 
that new money "stimulates  trade," that as a consequence of the new 
gold production,  output  of other goods would be increased  as well, and 
therefore  that  prices would not rise proportionately  with the increase  in 
the money stock. This third interpretation  is consistent with Fetter's 
puzzled observation  that there was very little contemporary  comment 
on the likely impact  of new gold on prices until the 1860s,  that is, until 
after the increase in prices had been observed (recall  that the work of 
Jevons and Laspeyres took place in the 1860s).23  And certainly the 
debates of  the  1880s and early 1890s over the monetary standard 
suggested  the widespread  belief that increased  money would stimulate 
trade;  it was not argued  that more  money would  merely  increase  prices. 
This interpretation  might also help to explain the failure of long-term 
interest rates to rise (at all in the first period, commensurately  in the 
second)  following  large  increases in gold production. 
As noted  above, gold was not the only source  of money. During  1879- 
1913  monetary  gold in the United States grew  by a factor  of 3.5, whereas 
the money supply  (as it is now calculated,  including  time deposits)  grew 
by a factor of about 8.4; bank deposits accounted for the difference, 
growing  by a factor of 9.8 during  this period.24 
Table 4  shows the growth in various forms of money in eleven 
and uncovered notes) in 1895, 37 percent of the U.S.  money supply, and 38 percent of the 
world money supply (most of the silver being in China and India). Gold can be estimated 
as about one-third of the world money  supply in 1848, although the ratio would be much 
higher in Britain and the United States (before the coinage under the Bland-Allison  Act). 
Monetary silver was  also growing during these  periods,  rapidly from  1895 to  1905, but 
most was then going to the Far East. See J. Laurence Laughlin, The History ofBimetallism 
in the United States (Greenwood Press,  1968; originally published in 1896), pp. 205-06. 
23.  Frank W. Fetter, Development  of British Monetaty  Orthodoxy, 1797-1875 (Har- 
vard University Press,  1965), pp. 240-46. 
24.  See Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz,  A Monetaty  Histoty  of the  United 
States,  1867-1960 (Princeton University  Press,  1963), table A-1. 18  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Table 4.  Comparative  Evolution  of Money  and  Reserve  Structure,  Selected 
Countries  and Years,  1885-1928 
Billions of U.S.  dollars 
Three countriesa  Eleven  countriesb 
Money supply and 
reserves  1885  1913  1885  1913  1928 
Money supply  6.3  19.8  8.4  26.3  50.4 
Gold  1.4  2.0  1.8  2.7  0.1 
Silver  0.7  0.6  1.0  1.2  0.3d 
Credit money  4.1  17.2  5.6  22.4  50.0 
Currencyc  1.6  3.8  2.3  5.9  13.0 
Demand deposits  2.6  13.3  3.3  16.5  37.0 
Monetary reserves  1.0  2.8  1.6  4.5  10.6 
Gold  0.6  2.1  0.9  3.2  7.9 
Silver  0.4  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.4d 
Foreign exchange  . .  .  0.1  0.1  0.5  2.3 
Total gold and silver  3.1  5.4  4.3  7.9  8.7 
Gold  2.0  4.1  2.7  5.9  8.0 
Silver  1.1  1.2  1.6  2.0  0.7d 
Sources:  Robert Triffin,''The  Evolution  of the International Monetary System:  Historical Reappraisal and Future 
Perspectives,"  Princeton  Studies  in International Finance  12 (Princeton  University,  1964), pp. 56, 62, for all series 
with the exception  of foreign exchange  held as  monetary reserves  in 1913, which was taken from Peter H.  Lindert, 
"Key  Currencies and Gold,  1900-1913,"  Princeton Studies  in International Finance 24 (Princeton  University,  1969), 
pp.  10-11,  23,  and the holdings  of  silver  by the  United  States  in  1928, which  was  taken from  U.S.  Bureau of the 
Census,  Historical  Statistics  of the Unzited  States,  Colonzial Tinies to 1970 (Government  Printing Office,  1975), pt. 2, 
p. 994. 
a.  United  States,  United  Kingdom,  and France. 
b.  United States,  United Kingdom,  France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,  Belgium, Sweden,  Switzerland,  Canada, 
and Japan. 
c.  Including subsidiary (nonsilver)  coinage. 
d.  United  States  only. 
industrial  countries between 1885 and 1928. Monetary  gold grew 120 
percent during  1885-1913,  while monetary  silver grew only 25 percent 
in  these countries.  The major  change,  however, was in demand  deposits, 
which  increased  by 400  percent,  rising  from  39  to 63  percent  of the money 
supply  as it is now defined.  The financial  system apparently  responded, 
with  a lag, to the perceived  shortage  of money  during  the 1880s  and  early 
1890s with institutional  innovation. This factor, to the extent that it 
influences  prices, compounds  the puzzle raised  above about  the impact 
of sharp  increases in gold production  on the price level: the impact  on 
prices should have been even greater  than the increase in gold stocks 
alone would suggest.25 
25.  It is of interest  to note,  however,  that contemporaries  did not consider  demand 
deposits to be part of the money supply; their inclusion is long after the fact. Both Jevons Richard N.  Cooper  19 
The central  lesson to derive from this brief review is that the supply 
of monetary  gold was highly  erratic  even during  the heyday of the gold 
standard.  The one feature the gold standard  did secure was stability  of 
exchange  rates among  major  currencies,  except for those that  remained 
on silver. Under the gold standard,  price stability  and other domestic 
objectives were, when necessary, relinquished  to preserve stability in 
exchange  rates. 
THE  INTERWAR  PERIOD 
There is no need to examine closely the brief restoration  of the gold 
standard  during  the late 1920s.  The experience was so brief and unsat- 
isfactory  that  it provides  no basis for an assessment  of the gold standard 
in more normal  times. Most European  countries called in the gold still 
held by their publics before the First World  War  and concentrated  it in 
the hands of the central  banks. The restored  gold standard  was a gold 
bullion  standard,  such as had been recommended  by Ricardo  over one 
hundred  years earlier, whereby the monetary authorities  bought and 
sold gold at a fixed price only in large quantities,  and did not coin the 
gold. Moreover, to conserve gold further  (for it was recognized  that at 
the much higher postwar price and activity levels the prewar gold 
standard  regime  could  not be restored),  there  was strong  encouragement 
toward  a gold exchange standard,  whereby  the monetary  authorities  of 
countries  would hold, instead  of gold, currencies  that were convertible 
into  gold, notably  sterling.  With  considerable  deflation,  Britain  returned 
to gold convertibility  in 1925  at the prewar  gold parity  (85 shillings  per 
ounce). France returned  to convertibility  in 1926  at a parity  one-fifth  of 
the prewar  parity.  It is widely considered  that  these parities  overvalued 
the pound and undervalued  the French franc, in each case putting 
considerable  strain  on the  pattern  of international  payments  and,  through 
them, on domestic economies. Britain  remained  depressed  throughout 
the 1920s, with unemployment  never dropping  below 10 percent after 
and Marshall considered  demand  deposits  to  be fundamentally  different from money, 
because,  as Marshall put it, in contrast to a bank note,  "a cheque requires the receiver to 
have formed some  opinion for himself as to the individual from whom he receives  it." 
Official Papers,  p. 35; also Jevons,  Money, pp. 336f. By 1911 Irving Fisher treats demand 
deposits  as money,  but with different attributes (including velocity)  from other forms of 
money.  Should contemporaries  have reasoned otherwise,  or is the concept  of money so 
slippery that it can only be determined long after the fact? 20  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
1920.  The system was supported  for a while by international  lending, 
but it collapsed  in 1931-33  under  the impact  of the world  depression,  to 
which the fragile  restoration  of the gold standard  contributed.  There is 
probably  not that much to be learned from this period about a gold 
standard,  except that "incorrect" exchange rates can put great strains 
on national  economies and, if they are important,  on the system as a 
whole.26 
It is perhaps  worth observing, in the light of subsequent  events, two 
prophesies  in this period  that  concerned  the role  of gold. Joseph  Kitchin, 
on the basis of his extensive study of the supply of gold during the 
nineteenth  century  and  its relation  to the price  level, testified  before the 
Royal Commission  in 1926  with respect to prices in England  (on a base 
of 1913 =  100)  that "it would seem evident  from  a study  of the chart  that 
they may go a considerable  way toward 90 in the next few years."27 
Prices  were then at 143;  by 1932  they were at 93. 
The second is an observation  by Keynes in January  1929, that new 
gold production  could add only about  2 percent  a year to monetary  gold 
stocks, against  a normal  requirement  of about 3 percent, thus necessi- 
tating  economy of gold to the extent of 1 percent a year. But in recent 
years  one legislature  after  another  had  stipulated  a minimum  gold  backing 
for the currency  outstanding,  a provision  that  made  no sense to Keynes 
in a regime  (such as prevailed  everywhere  outside the United States) in 
which currency was not readily convertible to gold. These require- 
ments, Keynes reckoned,  denied  the use of two-thirds  to three-quarters 
of monetary  gold  for meeting  external  drains,  and  thus  introduced  a great 
source of fragility  into the system: "It is not much with which to meet 
all the chances and fluctuations  of economic life. It follows that a very 
little upsets them [the central banks] and compels them to look for 
protection  by restricting  the supply  of credit  . . . raising  of rates  all round 
helps no one until, after an interregnum  during which the economic 
26.  An exhaustive  treatment of this period can be found in William A. Brown, Jr., The 
International  Gold  Standard  Reinterpreted,  1914-1934  (National  Bureau of  Economic 
Research,  1940). Brown contends  that the key to the pre-World War I gold standard was 
the preeminence of Britain as a market for goods and as a source of savings, and of London 
as a bank-clearing center and a source and repository of short-term credit. This preeminence 
was lost in the  1920s. Thus Brown argues that while the form of the gold standard was 
restored, its substance was not. 
27.  Warren and Pearson, Gold and Prices,  p. 95. Richard N.  Cooper  21 
activity of the whole world has been retarded,  prices and wages have 
been forced  to a lower level."28  This is exactly what happened. 
THE  SUPPLY  OF  GOLD  IN  THE  LATE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY 
As table 3 makes  clear, gold production  in the non-Communist  world 
rose during  the 1930s  (stimulated  in part  by higher  gold prices), receded 
in the 1940s, and rose gradually  to an all-time  high in the 1960s. New 
gold production  is supplemented  from time to time by sales from the 
Soviet Union, which is assumed  to be the second largest  gold producer, 
after  the Republic  of South Africa. Sales by the USSR are largely  keyed 
to its own  requirements  for  foreign  exchange,  which  in  turn  are  influenced 
mainly  by harvest  conditions. But the Soviet Union also pays attention 
to market  considerations.  It withdrew  from sales altogether  in the late 
1960s, when it became clear that something  dramatic  would probably 
happen to gold. After attempting  for several years to prevent market 
prices from rising above the official price of $35 an ounce, the United 
States also ceased selling into the London market  through  the "gold 
pool" in 1968  and  the market  price  started  its long  rise. The Soviet Union 
again in 1981  reduced its sales of gold (despite large needs for foreign 
exchange)  and allegedly  tried to borrow  against  gold collateral  to avoid 
further  depressing  the market  price. 
The principal  source of monetary  gold to most countries  of the world 
since the Second  World  War  was neither  new production  nor  Soviet gold 
sales, however, but a redistribution  of gold held by the United States. 
Total monetary  gold stocks grew about  200 million  ounces ($7 billion  at 
the official  U.S. price of $35 an ounce) between 1945  and 1969,  whereas 
the United States sold over 250 million  ounces during  the same period. 
Thus the "world" demand  for gold was satisfied  to a large  degree  from 
the United  States, which  in 1945  held  59 percent  of the world's  monetary 
gold. Even so, the holdings of dollars  by foreign monetary  authorities 
rose during  this period  by $13 billion, dollars  being fully convertible  to 
gold by monetary  authorities  at the U.S. Treasury,  so the demand  for 
28.  "Is There Enough Gold?"  The Nation  and Athenaeutm, January 19, 1929. Also 
reproduced in Donald Moggridge, ed.,  The Collected  Writings of John Maynard Keynes: 
Activities 1922-1929,  The Return to Gold and Indiustrial  Policy,  vol.  19, pt. 2 (Macmillan, 
1981), pp. 775-80. 22  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
international  reserves outside the United States was satisfied  nearly  as 
much  in that way as with augmented  gold holdings.  Robert  Triffin  early 
pointed  out the nonsustainability  of a system in which dollars  provided 
major  additions  to international  reserves,  gold  reserves  grew  only slowly 
(and  U.S. gold reserves declined), and the dollar  remained  convertible 
to gold.29  Official  gold convertibility  of the dollar  was in fact suspended 
in August 1971. 
World  gold production  declined steadily during  the 1970s, despite a 
sharp  rise in both the nominal  and the real price of gold (see figure  4). 
Gold prices have been so erratic  that it is difficult  to know what price 
has  been  used  for  planning  decisions  on production,  reopening  old mines, 
and developing new mines. The market  price of gold briefly reached 
$800  an ounce in early 1980,  but declined rapidly  again  from that peak. 
For the sake of round  numbers,  and without too much injustice  to the 
truth,  one can assume  that  the "planning"  price  of gold has risen  tenfold 
in the 1971-81 decade, from $35 an ounce (official price) to $350 an 
ounce. In real terms, using the U.S. GNP deflator  as a rough  and ready 
indicator  of world inflation  rates, this represented  a rise by a factor of 
five.30  This increase was not smooth, but tended to come in bursts; in 
late 1978,  for  instance,  the market  price  of gold  was about  $225,  a fourfold 
increase  in real  prices during  the 1970s  up to that  point. 
Despite  this  sharp  increase  in  real  prices,  gold  production  has  declined. 
South  African  production,  in particular,  declined  by one-third  between 
1970  and 1980  (see table 5). This performance  marks  a sharp contrast 
with the last major  increase in the real price of gold-during the 1930s, 
when world gold production  rose substantially.  Either  production  lead 
times must be substantially  longer today (gold having experienced a 
steady but gradual  decline in real prices since the Second World  War), 
or South Africa is supressing production  that would be profitable  at 
today's prices. It is said that marginal  mines have been brought  into 
29.  See especially  Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis (Yale University  Press, 
1960); the argument had been advanced earlier in articles. 
30.  This price was about 75 percent higher, in real terms, than the maximum real price 
of gold (measured in British prices) in the century before World War I, which occurred in 
1896. The likely instability in the real long-run price of gold is discussed in William Fellner, 
"Gold  and  the  Uneasy  Case  for  Responsibly  Managed  Fiat  Money"  in  Essays  in 
Contemporaty Economics  Problems  (Washington: American Enterprise Institute,  1981), 
pp. 97-121.  This interesting paper came to my attention after my own essay  was written. Richard  N.  Cooper  23 
Figure 4.  World Gold Production  and the "Real" Dollar Price of Gold, 1910-80 
Real price of gold (index,  1926  =  100)  Gold production  (millions of fine  ounce: 
600  20 
300  -0  (o 
Real price of gold" 
150  50 
75 -25 
Gold production 
45 -  *  15 
III  I  I  I 
1910  1920  1930  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980 
Sources:  Based on the figure presented  in Fred Hirsch,  "Influences  on Gold Production,"  Initernzationial  Moniet(ary 
Funzd  Staff Papers,  vol.  15 (November  1968), p. 416.  Data before  1966 are from the same  source,  pp. 486-88.  Data 
from  1967 to  1980 are  as  follows:  gold  production-Bank  for  International  Settlements,  Annuiiial  Report,  various 
issues;  gold prices-International  Monetary  Fund, Initertnationtal  Financial  Statistics,  various issues;  U.S.  producer 
price index-Council  of  Economic  Advisers,  Economic  Repott  of tlze Presidenit, Februanr 1982. 
a.  Average of daily London  fixing prices deflated by the  U.S.  producer price index for finished goods. 24  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Table 5.  New Gold  Supplies,  Selected  Years,  1965-80 
Millions of fine ouncesa 
Country or region  1965  1970  1975  1980 
South Africa  30.5  31.1  22.2  21.0 
Canada  3.6  2.3  1.6  1.5 
United States  1.7  1.7  1.0  0.9 
Other  5.2  4.4  5.0  5.8 
Total non-Communist  world  41.0  39.5  29.8  29.2 
Addenda 
Gold sales by the Soviet  Union  15.7  1.6  4.7  2.8 
Gold sales by the International 
Monetary Fundb  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  2.1 
Source:  Bank for International Settlements,  Annulial  Report,  various  issues. 
a.  Gold is measured in troy ounces,  equal to 31.104 grams, or about  10 percent heavier than an avoirdupois ounce. 
b. Gold sales  by the International Monetary Fund began in  1976. 
production  during  the 1970s and production  has been cut in the more 
profitable  mines.31  If so, considerable  central  direction  of South  African 
gold  mining  is implied,  or at a minimum  a strongly  oligopolistic  structure 
combined with expectations that real gold prices will decline in the 
future. 
South  Africa  estimated  its gold  reserves  in 1979  at 530  million  ounces, 
51 percent of the world total and 64 percent of the total in the non- 
Communist world (implying world reserves of  about 1,040 million 
ounces)  .32 This  would  imply  non-Communist  world  production  at  current 
rates for another twenty-seven years. Numerous allowances must be 
made with respect to this sort of calculation. "Reserve" figures are 
conceptually  tricky-they  imply  a known  geology, price, technology  of 
extraction,  and costs. But they give a rough  idea of informed  judgment 
on the remaining  gold to be extracted. 
An approximate  estimate  of nonmonetary  gold in the world  would be 
about 1,500 million ounces,  derived by  subtracting monetary gold 
holdings  from  known  and estimated  gold production  over the centuries. 
This is about one-third  higher  than monetary  gold holdings (excluding 
those in the Soviet Union). Current  new production,  virtually  none of 
which  has gone into monetary  gold holdings  for over a decade, amounts 
to 2.7 percent  of monetary  gold holdings  and  about 1  percent  of the total 
31.  See Federal Reserve  Governor Henry Wallich,  "Are There Alternative Ways of 
Fighting Inflation?" remarks at Cornell University,  October 28, 1981, p. 10. 
32.  Data provided by the Embassy of the Republic of South Africa, Washington, D.C. 
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outstanding  gold. It is unclear how sensitive the huge nonmonetary 
holdings  are to gold prices and  to price expectations. 
Contemporary  Proposals for Restoring Gold to a Monetary Role 
Proposals for reinstituting  a monetary role for gold cover a wide 
range, from reestablishing  gold backing  for the currency  at an official 
price to full-fledged  restoration  of a gold currency. I will discuss these 
proposals  under  two broad  headings:  gold backing  of all kinds without 
convertibility;  and  proposals  calling  for some  form  of gold  convertibility, 
ranging  from foreign monetary  authorities'  holdings to all holdings of 
dollars.  I address  only proposals  for  the United  States, although  as noted 
above, a desire to restore fixed exchange rates represents  part of the 
interest  in gold, and that requires  other countries  to reintroduce  gold as 
well. But so far there has been little interest from other countries in 
moving  toward  gold convertibility. 
It is worth recalling  at the outset that the United States had full gold 
convertibility  for the dollar  from 1879  to 1933  (with export restrictions 
imposed briefly during World War I); gold convertibility  for foreign 
monetary  authorities  from  1934  to 1971;  and  gold  backing  for  the  currency 
from  1879  to 1968.33  The  only  country  that  maintains  anyformal  monetary 
role for gold (apart  from holding gold among central bank assets) is 
Switzerland,  about  which more  will be said below. 
GOLD  RESERVE  REQUIREMENTS 
The idea behind gold backing without convertibility  is to limit the 
growth  in the supply of money and presumably  also to bolster psycho- 
logical support  for the currency by those who still attach a monetary 
significance  to gold and  do not fully  comprehend  that,  ultimately,  money 
is a social convention. 
33.  In 1933 the gold coins and gold certificates in the hands of the public were all called 
in. The Banking Act of 1934 established  the requirement that the Federal Reserve  Banks 
should  hold  35 percent  in gold  against  their deposit  liabilities  and 40 percent  against 
outstanding notes. In 1945  these requirements were reduced to a uniform 25 percent against 
both deposits and notes.  In 1965 the reserve requirement against deposits was eliminated, 
and in 1968 the reserve requirement against notes was eliminated. 26  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
The most limited  proposal  for gold backing  calls for stipulating  that 
the currency  in circulation  must be backed by the existing official  gold 
stock of the United States at its current  official  price  of $42.22  an ounce, 
and  that  the allowable  growth  in outstanding  currency  should  be limited 
to 3 percent a year after a transition  period, assured by revaluing  the 
existing gold stock by 3 percent a year.34  For the indefinite  future, this 
proposal  amounts  only to a monetary  rule  in thin  disguise;  gold plays no 
essential role.  One might just  as well back the currency with the 
Washington  Monument  or the Statue  of Liberty,  endowing  each with an 
initial  value and stipulating  that the value should increase at the fixed 
rate of 3 percent a year. Such a proposal  will not be considered  further 
here. 
Gold backing  for all or some portion  of the money supply  could also 
be required  at a fixed  price of gold, or at the market  price of gold, which 
fluctuates  substantially.  If the gold backing  requirement  does not bind- 
that is, if the value of the monetary  gold exceeds the requirement  for 
gold  reserves,  we would  be in  the realm  of discretionary  monetary  policy, 
as at present. When the reserve requirement  does bind, the monetary 
authorities  would  have to buy  gold  in  order  to increase  the money  supply. 
Unlike under a regime of convertibility,  the purchase  would be at the 
discretion  of the monetary  authorities. 
This kind  of arrangement  poses difficult  but not insuperable  technical 
problems  over the valuation  of monetary  gold, because in general the 
market  price must deviate from the official price if orderly monetary 
growth is to be maintained  (otherwise the permissible  monetary  base 
would fluctuate-wildly,  in recent experience-with  the market  price 
of gold). For example, the Treasury could buy gold necessary for 
increasing  the money supply  at market  prices, and  resell  it to the Federal 
Reserve banks at the fixed official  price, absorbing  the difference  as an 
expenditure  (or, if the official price were above the market  price, as a 
receipt). 
But the key point is that this would be a discretionary  regime,  not an 
automatic one, unless in addition a rule governing monetary growth 
were also imposed. It would involve extra discipline only insofar as 
34.  Robert E.  Weintraub,  "Restoring  the Gold Certificate Reserve,"  appendix to a 
study prepared by the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic 
Committee,  The Gold Standard:  Its History  and Record Against  Inflation,  97 Cong.  1 
sess.  (GPO, 1981), pp. 21-24. Richard N.  Cooper  27 
directors  at the Office of Management  and Budget and their superiors 
balk at budgeting  for gold when market  prices are considerably  higher 
than  the  official  price,  or  the secretary  of the  Treasury  balk  at  the  balance- 
of-payments  implications  of gold purchases.  A rough  idea of the magni- 
tudes is suggested  by the fact that  a 4 percent  growth  in the official  U.S. 
gold  stock-implying a 4 percent  growth  in that  component  of the money 
supply covered by gold reserves, if the reserves are binding-would 
involve a gross expenditure  of $4.2 billion  if the market  price were $400 
an ounce, and  a net expenditure  on the budget  of $3.75  billion  if the gold 
were resold to the Federal Reserve at the present official price. If the 
official  price  were increased,  say, to $200  an  ounce (with  a corresponding 
increase in the required gold reserve, to keep it binding), the gross 
expenditure  by the Treasury  for 4 percent growth would be the same, 
and the net expenditure  would be reduced to $2.1 billion. Obviously 
official  U.S. purchases  of the 10.6 million  ounces a year required  for 4 
percent annual  growth, amounting  to 35 percent of current  world gold 
production,  would very likely drive up the market  price of gold consid- 
erably. 
In short, gold backing  by itself does not provide  monetary  discipline. 
The United States had backing  for many years, and during  most of that 
period  the gold  reserve  requirements  were not  binding.  The  gold  reserves 
would have permitted  much  more  rapid  growth  than  what actually  took 
place. On the occasions when the reserve requirement  became  binding, 
it was lowered, and eventually removed. The national debt ceiling 
provides an analogous restraint  on U.S. government  borrowing;  it is 
there in principle, but in practice it is regularly  overridden  by other 
considerations,  even by "conservative" Congresses. 
Switzerland  is the only country  that currently  requires  gold backing 
for  its bank  notes, in a ratio  of 40 percent.  (Switzerland  ceased to provide 
for convertibility  of those notes into gold in 1954,  the year the London 
gold market  reopened.)  Swiss official  gold holdings  grew only 7 percent 
during  the inflationary  decade of the 1970s,  but the Swiss money supply 
grew by 65 percent. How was this possible? Switzerland  entered the 
period  with ample gold holdings  relative  to the required  backing,  more 
than  double  the legal requirement  in 1970.  The ratio  fell steadily  through 
the decade  to 53 percent  in 1981,  still  well above the required  40 percent. 
The restraint  in Swiss monetary  expansion has been discretionary,  not 
conditioned  by a binding  gold reserve  requirement. 28  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
What  will happen when the reserve requirement  becomes binding? 
Switzerland  would  have two  options,  apart  from  relaxing  the  requirement 
itself. It could raise its official  price of gold (which still stands at 4,596 
Swiss francs  a kilogram,  about  $80 an ounce at current  exchange  rates), 
which is well below the market  price, and which can be changed by 
simple government  decree (after consultation  with the Swiss National 
Bank). Or Switzerland could buy sufficient gold at market prices, 
something  that country  could probably  do without  greatly  affecting  the 
market  price of gold. Either  action would be discretionary  in nature. 
GOLD  CONVERTIBILITY 
Gold convertibility  exerts its discipline  in quite a different  way. The 
proposals involving convertibility  vary, some calling in effect for full 
convertibility  of all Federal  Reserve notes and 100  percent  gold money 
thereafter.  Bank  notes could be issued by private  banks,  but  they would 
in effect be depository receipts for gold.35  Others  are more limited, for 
example, calling for restoration  of the pre-1971  gold convertibility  for 
foreign  monetary  authorities.36 
Although the modus operandi would vary substantially  from one 
proposal to another, the underlying  idea is the same: whenever some 
substantial  group of dollar holders became dissatisfied  with monetary 
developments  and  unsure  about  the future  value  of the dollar,  they could 
and  presumably  would convert their  dollars  to gold. These conversions 
in turn  would require  the Federal  Reserve to defend  its gold reserves by 
tightening  credit  conditions  or otherwise  persuading  the relevant  public 
that  gold conversions  were unwarranted.  The system in principle  would 
be symmetrical:  as gold reserves increased, the money supply would 
expand; this feature has not been emphasized by most proponents  of 
gold convertibility. Moreover, historically central banks have often 
offset ("sterilized") the expansionary  effects of gold inflows, as the 
United  States did during  the late 1930s  and  again  during  the late 1940s.37 
35.  See  H.  Res.  391,  a bill  submitted  to  Congress  by  Representative  Ron  Paul in 
January 1981. 
36.  I leave aside suggestions that gold convertibility be reestablished only for residents 
of the  United  States  on the grounds that it would always  be possible  for foreigners  to 
arbitrage around such  restrictions  in the absence  of a comprehensive  set  of exchange 
controls. 
37.  Offsetting actions by central banks, in periods of contraction as well as periods of 
expansion,  even took place often in the heyday of the historical gold standard. See Arthur Richard N.  Cooper  29 
Sterilization  obviously would not be possible when gold (or gold certifi- 
cates) is the sole form  of money. 
Since new gold  production  is small  relative  to outstanding  gold  stocks, 
the requirement  for convertibility,  it is argued,  will automatically  limit 
the rate of money creation,  hence inflation,  since there is a natural  limit 
to how rapidly gold reserves can grow. Too rapid monetary growth 
would lead to conversion, which in turn (to preserve convertibility) 
would necessitate monetary  retrenchment. 
Note that most proposals  for convertibility-those that  fall short  of a 
move to 100 percent gold money-provide  for some elasticity to the 
supply  of money, so long as the relevant  public  is not of a disposition  to 
convert dollars into gold. This feature indeed could conceivably be a 
source of instability, since in periods of high "animal spirits" in the 
business and financial  community  outstanding  Federal Reserve credit 
could  rise substantially,  only to be sharply  reduced  as the buoyant  spirits 
give way to pessimism  and  a period  of heavy conversion  sets in, leading 
to a drop in Federal  Reserve credit below its historical  trend  under  the 
regime. 
There is no doubt that a regime  of gold convertibility  could be made 
to function  technically. But could it function  politically?  That is, could 
the political  authorities  resist the pressures  they would be under  to take 
countervailing  action in periods of distress, either too rapid  expansion 
or too rapid  contraction?  That  would depend  in part  on how serious the 
distress  was, which in turn  would  depend  in part  on the credibility  of the 
monetary regime itself: expectations of long-run price stability will 
reduce the inertial  character  of inflationary  impulses  to the U.S. econ- 
omy, and hence improve the ability of the economy to absorb both 
monetary  and real shocks with reduced  cost in terms  of lost output  and 
employment.  The argument,  in short, is that a constrained  monetary 
standard  will  dissuade  the  government  and  the  public  alike  from  believing 
they can "inflate" out of economic difficulties, and a gold standard 
would  provide  a constrained  monetary  standard. 
Or  would  it? Can  convertibility  be credibly  established?  Or  would  the 
public  believe that  a restored  gold standard  is bound  to be a fair  weather 
vessel, likely to capsize and  be abandoned  in the first  serious storm? 
One difficulty  with the credibility  of a requirement  for convertibility 
I.  Bloomfield,  Monetaiy  Policy  Under  the  International  Gold  Standard:  1880-1914 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York,  1959). 30  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
of U.S. dollars  into  gold  is the already  huge  volume  of liquid  dollar  assets 
around  the world. Federal Reserve liabilities at the end of 1980  were 
$158 billion; the U.S.  money supply was $415 billion (MI) or $1,656 
billion  (M2);  foreign  monetary  authorities  held an estimated  $240  billion 
in liquid  dollar  claims ($157  billion  directly  in the United States and the 
remainder  in various  "Eurodollar"  centers  around  the world),  and  other 
foreigners  held an additional  $700 billion, give or take several tens of 
billions, in dollar deposits (other than European interbank  deposits) 
outside  the United States. U.S. gold reserves, by contrast,  amounted  to 
only $11.1  billion  at the official  price  of $42.22  an ounce, and  $111  billion 
at $422  an ounce (which has no virtue  beyond being ten times the U.S. 
official  price and roughly  equal to the market  price at the end of 1981; 
the market  price  fell substantially  below that in early 1982). 
Full convertibility  would hardly be credible, given the relation of 
assets to potential claims. Of course, not all outstanding  liquid dollar 
claims would formally be convertible into gold; presumably  the con- 
vertibility requirement  would strictly apply only to Federal Reserve 
liabilities. But that provides no comfort, since the financial system 
functions on the supposition  that all liquid dollar claims can, on short 
notice, be converted into claims on the Federal  Reserve, either  federal 
funds  or currency.  To deny or repudiate  this more  general  convertibility 
is tantamount  to a breakdown  in the financial  system, both  domestic  and 
international.  Moreover, a major  strength  of the international  financial 
system at present is that for large holders (that is, leaving aside bank 
notes) it is a closed system, so funds can be moved around  in it but 
cannot be withdrawn  from it, except by the Federal Reserve System. 
This feature served the international  economy well in "recycling" the 
large  OPEC  surpluses  during  the last decade;  it would  be altered  by gold 
convertibility,  which would provide  a potential  leakage  to the system at 
the initiative  of dollar  holders, and thus could threaten  the system as a 
whole with a convertibility  crisis, as in 1931. 
With too little gold relative to the potential for conversion, a gold 
convertibility  system would be seen as a fair weather  system; expecta- 
tions about future  economic developments  would not be changed  radi- 
cally; and the real costs of monetary  adjustment  would continue to be 
high, casting further doubt on the political sustainability  of a gold 
convertibility  regime. 
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gold sufficiently  high  that  there cannot  be any doubt  about  the ability  of 
the United States to sustain even large-scale conversion, at least for 
some time. If $422 an ounce will not be persuasive, perhaps $844 an 
ounce would be, and $1,288  an ounce certainly  should  be (the last figure 
would result in a valuation of $333 billion on the existing U.S.  gold 
stock). 
But  with a much  higher  price, another,  equally  acute, problem  arises: 
not only would new gold production  increase substantially,  but sales 
from the large existing gold stocks and hoards would take place. The 
U.S. authorities  would find  themselves flooded  with gold. Consider  the 
privately  held stocks first. Much of the estimated 1,500  million  ounces 
of privately  held gold no doubt  is held for traditional  reasons, partly  for 
ornament,  partly  as precautionary  protection  against  untoward  political 
or economic events. But much of it, especially during  the 1970s, was 
also acquired  as an investment. With a credibly high official price of 
gold, the prospect  for further  capital  gains on these investments  would 
vanish,  and  gold as an investment  would  lose its luster, except to a small 
degree  for portfolio  diversification  against  remote contingencies. Thus 
there  would be large-scale  dishoarding.  Even some central  banks  might 
sell their gold under these circumstances, and for similar reasons: 
prospective  earnings  on alternative  assets would be much  higher. 
It is unclear  what  the supply  schedule  is for new production,  although 
it is presumably  upward  sloping  with  respect  to the price  of gold in terms 
of other  goods and services. In any case, as noted above, production  is 
not determined  simply  by marginal  costs today, but rather  is subject  to 
oligopolistic  manipulation  by the two major  suppliers,  South  Africa  and 
the Soviet Union, which are large enough to face a downward  sloping 
demand  schedule for gold. With a high and credible U.S. official  price 
of gold, in contrast,  the demand  schedule  becomes perfectly  elastic even 
for large  producers,  and there would then be no reason for them not to 
produce  as much  gold as it is economical  to produce. 
Thus there  would be a flood of gold into the United States, on a more 
modest scale if convertibility  were limited  to foreign  monetary  authori- 
ties, on a vast scale under full convertibility.  What should the United 
States  then do? To monetize  the gold would  be strongly  expansionary.38 
38.  It is for this reason that Sir Roy Harrod over the years favored an increase in the 
official price of gold.  See,  for example,  his Reforming  the World's Money (London:  St. 
Martin's Press,  1965), chap. 3. 32  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
This expansion  would presumably  endure  until  the price level had risen 
sufficiently  to reduce new gold production  to the point at which it just 
satisfies  the secular  growth  in demand  for gold. That  prolonged  adjust- 
ment hardly  satisfies the expectation of price stability  sought by advo- 
cates of gold convertibility.  The monetary  authorities  could sterilize  the 
monetary  impact  of the additional  gold, as they did  at various  times past. 
But then that  would mean  a return  to a world  of discretionary  monetary 
policy much  as what prevailed  from 1934  to 1971,  a period  during  which 
reliance  was placed  on the monetary  authorities,  not gold convertibility, 
for monetary  restraint. 
With  large holdings  of (sterilized)  gold in official  hands, there would 
be ample  room  for monetary  expansion  without  threatening  convertibil- 
ity, and when that room was exhausted  many  years later, people would 
rightly wonder why suddenly this constraint of gold supply, which 
had  not been operative  for many  years, should  induce  a rush  to convert, 
provoking  a restrictive  monetary  policy. They would simply  remove it. 
Is there a price that  just balances between these conflicting  consid- 
erations-too low a gold stock  to make  continued  convertibility  credible, 
or such a high  gold stock that it would exert no monetary  discipline  and 
de facto would be a regime  of discretionary  management?  Conceivably 
there  could  be such  a price,  one that  would  persuade  hoarders  to disgorge 
enough  gold such that  a combination  of the higher  price  and  the enlarged 
quantity  of monetary  gold would make the system credible  but not too 
undisciplined.  But my guess is that there is no such price. The relevant 
public would be skeptical about continued convertibility  up to quite a 
high price, and only then would be won over; but the price that would 
be persuasive  would be too high  to provide  the discipline. 
Whether  there  is such a price is irrelevant,  however, because there  is 
no way of finding  it. Any guess, however well informed  or rationalized, 
would obviously be seen to be a conscious policy choice. And therein 
lies the problem  of a restored  gold standard  as a source  of discipline  and 
automaticity:  once the price is recognized as a discretionary  variable, 
the discipline  that  a gold standard  could  conceivably  exert  would  be lost. 
One proposal deals directly with the difficulties  of choosing a price 
by allowing  the market  to determine  the price in the first  instance, and 
then allowing  the price to change (again, determined  by the market)  in 
periods  of great stress. In particular,  the starting  official  price would be 
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convertibility,  following  six months'  notice of the intention  to introduce 
a regime  of convertibility.  The official  price would then be fixed indefi- 
nitely  at this level, unless gold reserves  dropped  below 25 percent  of the 
target  level of gold reserves (set by the ratio  of gold reserves to Federal 
Reserve liabilities  on the day before resumption  of gold convertibility) 
or rose above 175  percent  of the target  level. In either  of these events, a 
"gold holiday" would be declared  for ninety days to allow the private 
market  to set a new price. During  gold holidays  the government  would 
not engage in either purchases  or sales of gold, nor would the Federal 
Reserve  be permitted  to alter  the monetary  base  by more  than  1  percent.39 
Within 50 and 125 percent of this target, monetary policy would be 
discretionary,  but  the degree  of discretion  would  be reduced  as the outer 
limits were approached. For instance, if gold reserves are above 125 
percent of target, the monetary  base must be increased  by 1 percent a 
month, and this rises to 2 percent a month if reserves are above 150 
percent  of target.  Below 50 percent  of target,  the monetary  base must  be 
reduced  by 1 percent  a month. 
This scheme, like the adjustable  peg system of exchange  rates, would 
provide strong  incentives to speculate  for or against  gold as the highly 
visible reserve level approached  the critical boundaries,  which, com- 
bined with the mandatory  adjustments  in monetary  base, would intro- 
duce a strong  source of instability  into the monetary  system. Moreover, 
while the method for choosing the official  price would ensure that the 
"market"  accepted  that  price  at the outset, the same  method  would  lend 
itself to manipulation  by large holders of gold, and in particular  to 
manipulation  by South  Africa  and  the Soviet Union, the  principal  sources 
of new gold. They would  have a strong  interest  in as high  an official  U. S  . 
price as possible, and therefore  would surely take all possible steps to 
withhold  new gold supplies  from  the market  during  the critical  six-month 
period  after the announcement.  Although  the price of gold is primarily 
an asset price because it is the price that persuades  the public to hold 
existing stocks of gold throughout  the world, even relatively small 
39. See S.6, "Gold Reserve Act of 1981," submitted  to Congress  by Senator  Jesse 
Helms in Congressional  Record, daily edition (January  5, 1981),  pp. S22-26. The basic 
idea derives from a proposal  by Arthur  Laffer, "The Reinstatement  of the Dollar:  The 
Blueprint,"  A. B. Laffer  Associates, February  29, 1980.  Laffer  likens  his proposal  to that 
made  by the United  States in 1972  for management  of exchange  rates  around  target  levels 
of international  reserves. 34  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
changes  in the stock relative  to changes  in demand  can have a substantial 
impact  on price. Thus, at the margin,  withholding  supplies  would raise 
the price. Expectations by the public concerning  future sales by these 
countries  would have no influence  on current  market  prices, since after 
resumption  day the United States would provide a perfectly elastic 
demand  at the indicated  price, so such sales would not be expected to 
depress  future  market  prices. 
Finally, shifts in market sentiment about gold or the dollar could 
under this regime trigger  prolonged monetary contractions or expan- 
sions. With no distinction  among  different  sources of disturbance,  this 
feature  could result  in greater  monetary  instability  rather  than  achieving 
its stated  purpose  of greater  stability.  For instance, another  disturbance 
in the oil market  resulting  in much  higher  oil prices  would  require  severe 
monetary  contraction  if either the public or the oil-exporting  countries 
decided to acquire gold, but no contraction if they did not decide to 
acquire  gold, and that decision in turn  would be heavily influenced  by 
the political  circumstances  surrounding  the disturbance,  not merely (or 
even mainly)  by monetary  conditions  in the United  States. This  proposal 
would certainly not offer the prospect for long-run  price stability that 
many proponents  of the gold standard  desire, and that Laffer ("price 
stability  would return  in short  order")  claims  for  it.40 
Another  approach  may  be possible  to deal  with  the excess of outstand- 
ing dollar  holdings  over existing U.S. gold reserves, and the difficulties 
that poses for determining  an appropriate  price for gold. Some of the 
outstanding  dollars  might  be "locked  up" in  a substitution  account  under 
the auspices of the International  Monetary  Fund to reduce the contin- 
gent claims on U.S.  gold. If enough dollars were converted to SDR 
(special drawing  rights)  claims on the substitution  account, usable only 
40. Laffer,  "Reinstatement  of the Dollar.  " Laffer  makes  much  of the analogy  between 
his proposal  and the official  U.S. proposal  of 1972,  described  in the Economic  Report of 
the President,  January 1973, concerning  an exchange rate regime. But the underlying 
purposes  of the two proposals  are completely  different.  The 1972  proposal  was designed 
to introduce  greater  symmetry  of adjustment  between countries  in deficit and those in 
surplus  into a system that presupposed  national  autonomy  in monetary  policy and was 
designed  to accommodate  that autonomy  as much  as possible, while still preserving  the 
alleged  advantages  of temporarily  fixed exchange rates. The Laffer-Helms  proposal,  in 
contrast, is designed to impose severe limits on autonomy  in national  (at least U.S.) 
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to finance  payments  deficits, perhaps  U.S. gold valued at, say, $422  an 
ounce would  represent  a credible  reserve. 
There  are  two difficulties  with  this idea. First, most of the outstanding 
dollars  outside the United States are in private  rather  than  official  hands 
and  could not be placed into a substitution  account  without  first  driving 
them into official hands, presumably  by creating  prospects for a weak 
dollar. Such an exercise would itself be hazardous  and would threaten 
the objective of monetary stability that motivates consideration  of a 
restored  gold standard. 
Second, at present, for a variety of reasons, many official  holders of 
dollars would be reluctant to exchange them for SDR-denominated 
claims  in a substitution  account, even claims that provide  considerable 
liquidity  to each holder  in case of balance-of-payments  need. The terms 
of the substitution  account would have to be very attractive  to induce 
many  developing  countries  to participate  in the scheme. The process of 
negotiation  over these terms and even the negotiated  outcome would 
very likely cast doubt  on the determination  of the community  of nations 
to restore  global  monetary  stability  or to help the United States restore 
the stability  of the dollar. 
I conclude this discussion of gold convertibility  regimes by noting 
that neither history nor logic offers compelling  reason to expect gold 
convertibility  to lead  to stable  prices. Exchange  rates  could  be stabilized 
only if other countries also introduced  gold convertibility  and if main- 
taining  that  convertibility  became  (as  it  was in  the  late  nineteenth  century) 
the principal  objective of policy. But if countries  were willing  to do that, 
they could do it without  the intermediation  of gold. 
There  is another  disadvantage  to reinstituting  gold in a monetary  role 
that  is in any way linked  to the market  for gold, directly  or indirectly.  As 
has already been noted, the principal  producers  of gold in the world, 
together  accounting  for nearly  80  percent  of world  production,  are  South 
Africa and the Soviet Union. Both countries exercise considerable 
discretion  in the amount  of gold they actually  put  onto the market  rather 
than allow competitive market  incentives to prevail. Both are, in very 
different  ways, at political odds with other members  of the community 
of nations. Restoring gold convertibility  would provide a windfall of 
considerable  magnitude  to those two countries.  They could sell all they 
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price  is worth  about  $1  billion  annually  to the Soviet Union  on its current 
estimated gold production and $2.2 billion to South Africa. For the 
reasons given above, a credible regime of gold convertibility would 
require  a substantial  increase in price above the current  market  level. 
An ill-conceived  attempt  to avoid this price increase  and  to rely on new 
supplies  to provide  for limited  monetary  growth  would place the mone- 
tary system of the United States hostage to political  decisions in one or 
both of these countries. 
NO  ESCAPE  FROM  DISCRETION 
The choice of a price for gold plays a central  role in the viability  of 
any restoration  of gold to a monetary  role. Yet the choice of a price, 
while crucial, is unavoidably  arbitrary  and is known  to be arbitrary.  So 
long  as this is so, a rule  based on a supposedly  fixed  price  of gold cannot 
be a credible  rule. If gold were to become unduly  constraining,  its price 
could  be changed,  and  that  would  be widely  known-indeed, it is intrinsic 
to the process of setting a price in the first place. In this respect, the 
situation today is fundamentally  different from the situation in the 
nineteenth  and early twentieth centuries. Then the dollar  price of gold 
was historically given and not open to question (except for minor 
adjustments  on several  occasions to preserve  the relation  to silver). The 
price  was not conceived as a policy variable.  Now it is, indeed  must be. 
Yet gold ceases to provide  monetary  discipline  if its price can be varied. 
So long as the price of gold is a policy variable,  a gold standard  cannot 
be a credible disciplinarian.  It provides no escape from the need for 
human  management,  however frail  that  may seem to be. 
Other Commodity Standards 
The failure of the gold standard  to achieve price stability was well 
understood  by many who lived through  it, and provoked  thought  about 
what arrangements  might  produce greater  stability. Most of the public 
debate  in the nineteenth  century  focused around  the alternative  of silver 
(which  conceptually  had  the same  disadvantages  as gold),  of bimetallism, 
and  of using  paper  currency  elastically  to supplement  gold in periods  of 
stringency.  In the twentieth century serious proposals have arisen for 
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the definition  of money according  to the movement  of some commodity 
price index, and for monetary  policy to be keyed formally  and directly 
to a price  index. Each  of these ideas  had  nineteenth-century  antecedents. 
BIMETALLISM  AND  SYMMETALLISM 
Bimetallism  endows two metals, gold and silver, with full monetary 
status  at a fixed  price. Because variations  in supply  and  in nonmonetary 
demand  are  unlikely  to be perfectly  correlated,  this system  can generally 
be expected to provide greater price stability in the long run than 
monometallism,  provided the monetary authorities  do not run out of 
either metal-that  is,  provided they hold reserves large enough to 
maintain  the fixed price between the metals so that both of them stay in 
circulation.  Variations  in the relative supply of gold and silver plagued 
bimetallism  over the years. It was Newton's overpricing  of gold at the 
English  mint that failed to retain  the recently reminted  silver coins and 
inadvertently  placed Britain  on the gold standard.  The gold value of the 
U.S. dollar was adjusted  in 1834  to correct for the previous underval- 
uation of gold, and overdid it (the silver-gold  mint ratio was changed 
from 15:1  to 16:1),  leading  to an overvaluation  of gold and the export of 
silver. Generally speaking, French coinage was sufficiently  important 
during  the nineteenth  century  to keep the price of silver relative  to gold 
around  France's  official  mint  ratio  of 15k:  1, but  this was after  the Nevada 
discoveries  of 1859  and  the decision of Germany  to switch  from silver  to 
gold in 1871, followed by Scandinavia,  France was unable to hold the 
ratio and abandoned  unlimited  coinage of the silver five-franc  piece in 
1874. 
Alfred  Marshall  pointed  out the difficulties  in maintaining  a fixed  price 
between any two commodities over time, and suggested that "true 
bimetallism"  should define the currency  in terms of fixed quantities  of 
the two metals, leaving  the relative  price  free to vary. Marshall  favored 
a symmetallic  standard,  as Edgeworth  called it, over a monometallic 
one. At first  he shied  away  from  actually  recommending  it on the grounds 
that  a change  in the monetary  standard  would  be too disruptive  tojustify 
the modest gains from it, but as agitation  over the standard  mounted, 
he beaan to advocate  it.41 
41.  Marshall, Official Papers,  pp. 14-15, 30-31. 38  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
COMMODITY  RESERVE  CURRENCY 
A logical  extension of Marshall's  proposal  would  be to enlarge  the list 
of commodities,  fixed in quantity,  in which the monetary  unit is defined 
and against  which it is issued. This was done by Benjamin  Graham  and 
his unrelated  namesake,  Frank  Graham,  in the 1930s.  Benjamin  Graham 
proposed  that the dollar  be defined  in terms of a fixed-weight  bundle  of 
twenty-three  commodities  (reduced  to fifteen  in  his international  variant) 
and  that  the Federal  Reserve issue notes against  warehouse  receipts  for 
the bundle  thus defined.42  His proposal  was to supplement  the existing 
monetary  system with commodity  money. Frank  Graham  would have 
included a much longer (but unspecified) list of commodities in his 
commodity  bundle, and he would have substituted  commodity  money 
for all other forms of money, at least in terms of future  growth. At the 
margin,  he favored  what was called 100  percent  money;  in effect all new 
currency  and demand  deposits would represent  warehouse  receipts for 
the commodity  bundles. He recognized  that this preferred  variant  was 
not realistic  and  he was willing  to settle for less.43 
Benjamin  Graham  selected his proposed  commodities  on the basis of 
their  economic importance  and  their  storability.  Commodity  production 
was monetized  under  the scheme, but  the relative  prices  of commodities 
were left free to vary; only the average  price level was held constant  in 
terms  of dollars.  Graham  was motivated  in large  measure  by antidepres- 
sion considerations;  he felt that support  for primary  commodity  prices 
in  times  of economic  slack  would  help  stabilize  overall  economic  activity. 
By the same  token, release  of commodities  (demonetization)  would  help 
to limit booms, both by supplying  commodities out of stocks and by 
contracting  the money supply. His scheme in effect would provide 
42. Graham's  short list comprised  wheat, corn, cotton, wool, rubber,  coffee, tea, 
sugar,  tobacco, petroleum,  coal, wood pulp,  pig  iron,  copper,  and  tin. At 1937  prices,  coal 
and  wheat  were  the most  important  (over 13  percent  each),  tea and  tin  the  least  (2.1 percent 
each). See Benjamin  Graham,  Storage and Stability (McGraw-Hill,  1937);  and World 
Commodities  and World  Currencies  (McGraw-Hill,  1944),  p. 45. The  scheme  was  originally 
proposed  by Graham  in 1933.  W. Stanley  Jevons suggested  a "multiple  legal  tender"  that 
could  be interpreted  as a commodity  standard  in the same vein, but he actually  proposed 
indexation  of contracts  by a commodity  price  index, without  distinguishing  between the 
two. See Jevons, Money,  p. 327. 
43.  See  Frank D.  Graham, Social  Goals  and Economic  Institutions  (Princeton  Uni- 
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perfectly  elastic  demand  for  the  commodities  (taken  as a bundle)  included 
in the monetary unit in times of depressed economic activity, and 
perfectly elastic supply (so long as physical stocks lasted) in times of 
boom. 
Stabilizing  the price  level of a limited  bundle  of storable  commodities 
will stabilize the general  price level only if the terms of trade between 
the commodities  in question and manufactured  goods (and services, if 
the "general" price level is taken to be the consumer  price index) are 
unchanging  over time.44  Apart  from  both the improbability  of satisfying 
this condition  and the resources tied up in the monetized commodities 
(reckoned  by proponents  to be about  3 to 4 percent  annually  of the value 
of the stored commodities)-a  factor  that also applies  to gold, although 
on a smaller  scale-it  is unclear  why there  has not been more  enthusiasm 
for commodity-reserve proposals. Such proposals have found little 
interest beyond intellectuals. I suspect that conservatives really want 
gold, for reasons of history and sentiment, whereas nonconservatives 
prefer  managed  money.45  Also, the schemes are basically too compli- 
cated to appeal  to a wider  public. 
Benjamin  Graham  pointed out in 1961  that between the Commodity 
Credit Corporation  and the strategic stockpile, the U.S. government 
44. In the United States the price of crude materials-including oil-rose  by 201 
percent  between  1947  and 1980;  wholesale  prices  of finished  manufactures,  by 265  percent; 
and  prices  of services (in  the consumer  price  index),  by 429  percent. 
45. It is of interest, though,  that F. A. Hayek viewed commodity  money favorably; 
see his "A Commodity  Reserve  Currency,"  Economic  Journal,  vol. 53 (June-September 
1943),  pp. 176-84. 
Keynes and Friedman  both opposed it. Keynes, though  highly  supportive  of stabili- 
zation schemes for individual  commodities,  opposed a commodity  reserve currency  on 
the grounds  that it would have the same disadvantages  as a gold standard  in failing  to 
persuade  organized  labor  that they should  keep their demands  for money wages in line 
with the increase in efficiency wages (that is, productivity).  He considered  the risk of 
excessive money wage demands  as one of the major  obstacles to maintenance  of a full 
employment  economy. See his 1943  letter  to Benjamin  Graham,  reprinted  as an appendix 
to B. Graham in Yeager, ed., In Search of a Monetary Constitution, pp. 215-17. 
Milton  Friedman  also opposed a commodity-reserve  currency  on the grounds  that a 
full commodity-reserve  currency,  lacking  the mystique  and historical  legitimacy  of gold, 
would  in time  become  financially  burdensome  because  of the real  costs associated  with  it. 
This in turn  would result in dilution  of the concept, through  various  economies, which 
would lead in effect to discretionary  policy, which he also opposed. It is therefore 
dominated  both by a gold standard,  with its mystique, and by a properly  managed  fiat 
money, which Friedman  favors. See his "Commodity-Reserve  Currency"  in Essays in 
Positive  Economics  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1953),  pp. 204-50. 40  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
during  the 1950s acquired  enormous reserves of both agricultural  and 
nonagricultural  commodities valued at $16 billion (over 10 percent of 
the money supply in 1960).  Part  of these acquisitions  were even mone- 
tized through the federal budget deficit and the Federal Reserve's 
acquisition  of Treasury  bills. So the costs were incurred  anyway, but in 
the name of other objectives and sometimes with a destabilizing  rather 
than  a stabilizing  influence  on price  movements.46 
The idea of a commodity  currency  was revived in 1964  in an interna- 
tional context by Albert Hart, Nicholas Kaldor, and Jan Tinbergen. 
They proposed  an International  Commodity  Reserve Currency  (ICRC) 
in lieu of an increase  in the price of gold or reliance  on a world  fiduciary 
money  as a solution  to the problem  of growing  reliance  on the U.S. dollar 
as a reserve currency  and increasing  dissatisfaction  with that arrange- 
ment.47  They were flexible on the composition  of the ICRC, suggesting 
thirty commodities for illustrative purposes only. The commodities 
should be chosen for their importance  in international  trade, and with 
that in mind the composition of the ICRC should be reviewed and if 
appropriate  altered at five-year intervals. (They do not address the 
question  of the relative price changes  that would occur when individual 
commodities  are greatly increased or reduced in importance  following 
these reviews, and are consequently purchased  or sold from stocks.) 
This scheme is not designed to stabilize national  price levels because 
countries are free to pursue autonomous  monetary  and exchange rate 
policies, but rather is intended to stabilize the "real value" of the 
international  unit of account. Curiously, their proposal also includes 
parallel  treatment  of gold, which would not be included in the ICRC 
bundle.  The International  Monetary  Fund  was thus to be left the task of 
stabilizing the price of gold in terms of the ICRC, reminiscent of 
bimetallism.  Given sponsorship  of the proposal  by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, one can assume that it was 
designed to appeal to developing countries by providing  demand for 
primary  products in the bundle; but, as with the Graham  proposal, 
46.  See Benjamin Graham, "The Commodity-Reserve  Currency Proposal Reconsid- 
ered," in Yeager, ed., In Search of a Monetary Constitution, pp. 185-214. 
47.  See A. G. Hart, Nicholas Kaldor, andJanTinbergen, "The Caseforanlnternational 
Commodity Reserve  Currency,"  in Nicholas  Kaldor, Essays  on Economic  Policy,  vol. 2 
(Norton,  1964), pp.  131-77;  also  A.  G.  Hart,  "The  Case  as  of  1976 for International 
Commodity-Reserve  Currency,"  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol.  1 2, no.  1 (1976), pp. 
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relative  prices  are  left  free to vary, so there  is no perfectly  elastic  demand 
for any particular  commodity. 
INDEXATION 
The complexities of a multiple-commodity  standard  can be avoided 
by the simple  expedient  of indexing  all dollar-denominated  contracts  by 
a suitably  broad  price index, provided  the supply of money is limited. 
The basic idea goes back at least to Joseph Lowe, who suggested in 
1822, long before price indexes were constructed, that contracts be 
adjusted  for changes in the general  value of commodities.  The idea was 
promoted  a decade later by George Poulett Scrope, who is sometimes 
credited  with inventing  the "tabular  standard,"  since he mentions the 
possibility of adjusting  the legal tender as well as contracts. Writing  in 
1875, Jevons proposed that indexation of contracts be adopted on a 
voluntary  basis at first, but that later it might  be made compulsory  for 
all contracts in excess of three months, indirect  evidence that the real 
value of deferred  payment  was not preserved  under  the gold standard. 
He argued  that indexation  would represent  an easy change;  all that  was 
necessary was a dispassionate  government  office to collect and collate 
the  price  information,  publishing  its results  fully so they  would  be subject 
to public review and criticism.48  Marshall  also advocated indexation, 
and urged the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and 
Industry  to attend  to developing  a purchasing  power index, or govern- 
ment unit, as he called it. He believed that once it was understood  it 
would be popular  in contracts; unlike his proposal for symmetallism, 
about which he was somewhat diffident,  he considered indexation  on 
the urgent  and  active agenda  for reform.49  In  fact, the British  government 
did not publish a consumer price index until 1914, nearly thirty years 
later;  the U.S. government  did so in 1919. 
THE  TABULAR  STANDARD 
Indexation  can  be carried  a step  further,  to include  money  itself, along 
with some link to the supply of money. This is known as the tabular 
48.  Jevons,  Money,  p. 331; characteristically,  Jevons  also discusses  Lowe,  Scrope, 
and other antecedents.  See  also Frank Fetter, British Monetary  Orthodoxy, p.  139; and 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis  (Oxford University Press,  1954). 
49.  Marshall, Official Papers,  p. 12. 42  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
standard,  and is alluded to by Scrope in 1833, described  by Jevons in 
1875,  advocated  by Irving  Fisher  in 1920,  and  recently  revived  by Robert 
Hall.50  Fisher proposes that the definition  of the dollar  in terms of gold 
(he was writing  during  the gold standard  period) should be indexed to 
the cost of living.  Contracts  would  be written  in terms  of dollars,  without 
indexation,  but indexation  would be automatic  by adjusting  the dollar. 
If, for example,  the relevant  price  index  fell, the number  of grains  of gold 
that defined the dollar as a unit of account would be reduced by a 
corresponding  amount. In other words, for purposes of settling debts, 
the goods value of the dollar  would  be preserved,  since more  gold would 
be required  to settle a given debt denominated  in dollars. The reverse 
adjustment  would take place if the relevant  price index rose.5' 
This scheme amounts to full indexation of all contracts, including 
gold-convertible  paper  money, against  changes  in the real  value of gold, 
with gold remaining  the formal basis of the dollar. In addition, Fisher 
would  have adjusted  the gold money supply  in parallel  with adjustments 
in the gold value of the dollar.  If prices  fell, for instance,  the gold content 
of the dollar  would be reduced,  that is, the dollar  price of gold would be 
raised, and gold would flow into the Treasury  (against  the issuance of 
gold certificates)  from  private  hoards,  from  abroad,  and  eventually  from 
new production.  The reverse would occur if prices rose. Fisher would 
have reinforced  this natural  influence  by issuing new gold certificates 
against  the capital  gains on existing Treasury  stocks of gold, or retiring 
gold certificates  in the event of rising  prices, although  this was not an 
essential  part  of his proposal.52 
Robert Hall has recently revived the ideal of a tabular standard 
(without endorsing  it), but he would substitute  for the role of gold in 
Fisher's standard  a weighted  average  of four commodities  (ammonium 
50. See Jevons, Money;  Irving  Fisher, Stabilizing  the Dollar (Macmillan,  1920);  and 
Robert  E. Hall, "Explorations  in the Gold Standard  and Related  Policies for Stabilizing 
the Dollar,"  in R. E. Hall, ed., Inflation,  forthcoming. 
51. Irving  Fisher, Stabilizing  the Dollar. Fisher  observes in the preface  that most of 
his ideas  were conceived  before  the First  World  War,  in other  words  during  the heyday  of 
the gold standard.  Some of Fisher's  comments  on the disasters  of the gold  standard  can be 
found  on p. 117. 
52. Ibid., appendix  I. To avoid  the problem  of constant  reminting,  Fisher  would  have 
retired  all gold coins and  moved  to a convertible  gold  bullion  standard.  According  to him, 
"gold" in circulation  was overwhelmingly  in the form of gold certificates,  yellowbacks, 
with  most of the monetary  gold already  in the hands  of the Treasury. Richard N.  Cooper  43 
nitrate,  copper,  aluminum,  and  plywood, ANCAP  for short)  whose price 
index has tracked  very closely the U.S. consumer  price index over the 
past thirty  years."3  The dollar  would be defined  in terms of a specified 
combination  of physical  quantities  of these commodities,  and  they would 
be legal tender in settlement of debts. Fiat money would presumably 
disappear,  and bank notes could be issued freely, fully redeemable  in 
ANCAPs. When the consumer price index rose, the dollar would be 
redefined  to contain  more  ANCAPs. In this way, contracts  with  deferred 
payment  written  in terms of dollars  would involve repayment  that was 
constant  in terms of purchasing  power, as measured  by the consumer 
price index. Unlike the Grahams,  Hart-Kaldor-Tinbergen,  and Fisher, 
Hall would not require or even permit the government to engage in 
purchases  or sales of the commodities  comprising  ANCAP. The govern- 
ment would simply define the dollar in terms of ANCAPs and would 
endow them with the attribute of legal tender, so that private and 
government  debts in effect would  be settled  in ANCAPs or paper  claims 
to them. Private  arbitrage,  which would involve some physical storage 
of the commodities  in ANCAP, would  ensure  that  a paper  dollar  or  dollar 
demand  account remained  equal in value to the current  ANCAP defini- 
tion of the dollar. 
Hall suggests that this would be a perfectly workable  arrangement, 
but sees no advantage  in it over a well-managed  fiat  money. He prefers 
a system whereby  monetary  policy would be keyed to deviations  of the 
consumer  price  index  from  its target  values (ultimately,  after  a transition 
period,  zero change):  for each percent  the consumer  price  index  is above 
its target  the Federal  Reserve would engage  in open market  sales with a 
view to raising  the Treasury  bill rate by 0.1 percent; and it would act 
similarly  each month  that the consumer  price index exceeded its target, 
so the effect would  be cumulative.S4 
53. Robert  Hall, "Explorations  in the Gold  Standard." 
54. Robert  E. Hall, "A Free-Market  Policy to Stabilize  the Purchasing  Power  of the 
Dollar" (Hoover Institution  and Stanford  University, December 1981).  To work, this 
proposal  assumes  that  the response  of the price  level to changes  in the supply  of money  is 
reasonably  rapid;  long  response  lags  could  lead  to explosive  oscillation  of both  money  and 
prices.  Hall's  proposal  was anticipated  in 1832  by Charles  Jones,  who "advocated  a policy 
of price  stabilization  by a national  bank  of issue through  open market  operations,  buying 
public  debt when a twenty-commodity  price  index fell, and selling  public  debt when the 
price index rose."  See Fetter, Development  of British Monetary Orthodoxy, p. 139. 44  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Conclusions 
Consideration  of the gold standard  involves three quantities:  gold; 
paper money (including demand deposits) called dollars; and some 
composite of goods and services in which members of the public are 
directly interested, for example those used to construct the consumer 
price index, a composite that we  can call goods.  There are three 
"prices" linking these three quantities:  the dollar price of goods, the 
dollar price of gold, and the gold price of goods, or the commodity 
terms of trade between gold and other goods. Because any one of 
these relative prices can be derived from the other two, only two of 
them are independent:  (dollar/goods) =  (gold/goods) x  (dollar/gold) 
or ($/G)  =  (A/G)  x  ($/A), where G stands for goods  and A stands for 
aurum (or ANCAP). Inflation  involves the first of these three prices, 
$/G.  In  attempting  to limit  inflation,  advocates  of the gold  standard  would 
fix the third price, the dollar price of gold (or, equivalently, the gold 
content  of the  dollar).  This  can  be done  if  the  government  has  a sufficiently 
large stock of gold relative to the stock of dollars outstanding  and if, 
when necessary, it devotes control of the supply of dollars to that 
objective. Alternatively, it can be done by going to a pure metallic 
currency,  in which "dollars"  are gold. These advocates contend  that  by 
fixing  the dollar  price of gold, $/A, they will stabilize  the dollar  price of 
goods, $/G. Both history and logic refute this contention, however, 
because in general  the relative price between gold and other commodi- 
ties, A/G, is variable  over time. To be sure, there  is some feedback  from 
A/G to the supply of gold, because this price influences the cost of 
extracting  gold. But this influence  occurs only with long lags, and even 
then it is weak because gold is an exhaustible  resource, not in perfectly 
elastic long-run  supply. It would be necessary to argue  that in the long 
run both discovery and technical change adapt so as to assure a fixed 
terms  of trade  between gold and  goods. Certainly  this price,  A/G, in fact 
showed great variation  in the nineteenth  century, and it also showed a 
great change during  the 1970s  when gold prices rose much more than 
goods prices did (A/G fell by about 80 percent). In short, A/G is too 
variable  to permit  $/G  to be stabilized  by fixing  $/A. 
The Graham  and the Fisher and Hall schemes seek to control the 
dollar  price of goods directly. The Graham  plan would do so by buying 
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sufficiently  broadly  defined  bundle so that its price is highly  correlated 
with all goods. Even so, it is necessary to be concerned with long-run 
divergences in the relative price between their suggested composites 
and  goods more  generally.  Frank  Graham  would also control  tightly  the 
quantity  of dollars  by making  commodity  bundles  the exclusive source 
of (additional)  money. 
The tabular  standard  of Fisher and Hall would define the dollar as 
some commodity or composite commodity, then would adjust the 
definition  of the dollar  at regular  intervals  to ensure  dollar  price stability 
of a large bundle of goods and services, such as the consumer price 
index: $/G can be stabilized  (to be sure, as Hall points out, not always 
without  economic hardship)  by adjusting  $/A to offset exactly changes 
in the real price AIG, which under a commodity standard  is the sole 
source  of instability  in the general  level of prices. 
In summary, if stabilizing the dollar price of commodities is the 
objective, fixing the dollar price of gold is not the way to achieve it. 
Direct  action on the dollar  price of goods is more  likely  to be successful. 
But as was noted at the beginning  of this paper, an objective-perhaps 
the dominant  one-of  the advocates of a restoration  of gold is to reduce 
greatly or even  eliminate discretion in the hands of the monetary 
authorities.  It is noteworthy  that all of the commodity-based  proposals 
except that of Benjamin  Graham  sharply  reduce  or eliminate  altogether 
discretion  in monetary  management.55 
Seen this way, these proposals, taken together, raise the interesting 
philosophical  question of why one should think that experts are more 
clever at devising  operational,  nondiscretionary  monetary  regimes  than 
they are at monetary  management  within  a discretionary  regime. If the 
desire for a nondiscretionary  regime is really simply another way- 
misguided,  as shown above, in the case of gold-of  assigning  priority 
above all others to the objective of price stability  in the management  of 
monetary  policy, that can be done directly by instructing  the Federal 
Reserve unambiguously  to take whatever  action is necessary to ensure 
price  stability.  If collectively we are ambivalent  about  that  priority,  that 
is the principal  source of the problem,  not the nature  of the regime. 
55.  In this  respect,  the  proposal  of  Helms  and Laffer  is  a compromise:  it retains 
discretion in monetary management within a range, but increasingly limits that discretion 
as the official supply of gold continues to shrink or to rise. In doing so, it gives gold a major 
signaling or thermostatic function, but thereby ignores the function of gold as a commodity 
and the false signals that it might send. Comments 
and Discussion 
Rudiger Dornbusch: Irving Fisher, in considering  the gold standard, 
thought  its instability  was all too apparent  by 1920 and that gold was 
poorly suited as the cornerstone  of a system of price stability.  It is true 
that  he also discounted  other  programs,  particularly  municipal  slaughter- 
houses, state bakeries, destruction of trade unions (with some reluc- 
tance, I think),  repeal of the tax on margarine,  and bolshevism.  ' Fisher 
recognized what is at work once again today: ".  . . any price disturbance 
gives a hearing  to all manner  of reform  movements,  whether  apropos  or 
irrelevant, and whether good or bad or indifferent.  ..  . Reckless  radi- 
calism  rides in on the wave of high  prices.  99"2 
Richard  Cooper's paper addresses the gold standard  question in an 
informative  and uncontroversial  manner.  His analysis of the historical 
evidence cannot be faulted either in his treatment of facts or in the 
richness  of anecdote. His treatment  of the policy options is congenial, 
and  I entirely  share  his conclusion  that  we are  probably  worse at building 
foolproof  mechanisms  to guard  against any and all contingencies than 
we are, and  have been, at managing  money in the public  interest. Below 
I reinforce  some of the points he makes. 
The gold standard  era is thought  of as a period  of price stability.  This 
is certainly  the view taken by many proponents  of the present day. In 
testimony before the Gold Commission  price stability under the gold 
standard  was given as the characteristic  of nineteenth  century experi- 
ence. But as Cooper's paper shows, price stability  was most assuredly 
not the rule, and it is worth asking what leads to the widespread 
misinformation  on this point. 
1. Irving Fisher, Stabilizing the Dollar (MacMillan,  1925), pp. 79-80. 
2.  Ibid. pp. 74-76. 
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Although wholesale prices varied considerably over the years in 
question, the consumer price index published by the U.S.  Bureau of 
Labor Statistics shows little variation and in fact remains entirely 
unchanged  for spans of several years. This is the fact widely quoted  and 
taken in support of the price stability claim. But it is also clear that 
statistics  on nineteenth  century  retail  prices are very poor, indeed. For 
the period  from 1880  to 1890,  for example, the BLS index of consumer 
prices  used the wholesale  prices  of food and  clothing,  assumed  that  rent, 
which accounted for nearly 20 percent of the index, was constant 
throughout  the period, and assumed  that  the prices of other  items in the 
index  moved at the same  rate  as the average  for rent,  food, and  clothing.3 
There is little reason to believe that the wholesale price index does not 
tell a better story of what was happening  to prices. 
In fact, this is more plausible in view of the substantial  political 
agitation  over trends in price levels. Once more I quote Irving  Fisher: 
"It was during  falling prices that such money-lenders  as Hetty Green 
and Russell Sage made their  fortunes. After 1896  and up to the present 
this would have been impossible. For even had they saved every penny 
of interest  and compounded  it, they would have had only their  labor  for 
their  pains and less actual  purchasing  power in the end than when they 
began!  Because of our shrinking  dollar  no one could have accumulated 
fortunes  by simple  saving  and investment  at interest  since 1896. 
"Hence it is that a new class of rich now inhabit  the palaces of Fifth 
Avenue. The 'bloated  bondholders'  could not keep up the old magnifi- 
cence under  the growing  strain  of high  prices. They have given place to 
the 'profiteers.'  In these two phrases  the great  untutored  public  shows a 
curious  intuitive  sense for the truth  which it cannot quite comprehend. 
It knows at least 'who got the money.' " 
And Fisher further states:  ".  . . recently  a visitor in Kansas  could 
find no populist. The reason given was that 'there is too much money 
now for populism'."4 
While there can be little question that the trend in price levels gave 
rise to political discontent climaxing  in the Democratic  convention at 
Chicago  in 1896,  there is also a question  of the predictability  of prices in 
3.  See Ethel D. Hoover,  "Retail Prices After 1850," in National Bureau of Economic 
Research,  Trends  in  the  American  Economy  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (Princeton 
University Press,  1960), pp. 141-90. 
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the short  term. The short and medium  run  is the time span in which the 
balance between real uncertainty and transactions costs,  in a broad 
sense,  is  effectively resolved by fixed money contracts. But such 
arrangements,  of course, presuppose  short-term  stability  and predicta- 
bility in price levels. There was very little of that in the late nineteenth 
century. Anyone who in the early 1890s  extrapolated  the path of prices 
and purchased  a long-term  bond would have been rudely surprised  by 
the gold discoveries of the later  part  of the decade. Anyone making  one- 
or two-year contracts  could be confronted  by large  changes in the real 
value  of the contract.  It is unclear  whether,  even with  today's uncertain- 
ties, prices are not more predictable  over a one- or two-year horizon 
than  they were in the late nineteenth  century. 
The second feature of the gold standard  that I wish to discuss is the 
automaticity  of the system as a regulator  of the money supply. There is 
little  question  that  the gold standard  at no time  functioned  automatically 
with the Federal Reserve practicing  a 100  percent marginal  reserve. It 
came closest under  Peel's Act in Great  Britain,  when the Issue Depart- 
ment of the Bank of England  traded  bullion  for notes on a 100  percent 
reserve  ratio  at  the margin.  But  the  Banking  Department  greatly  benefited 
from monetary tightness during  periods of bullion outflow, increased 
credit, and reduced its own reserve position, thus partially  sterilizing 
the bullion  flow. Then, once a panic came, the Bank's reserve position 
was defended  by selling consols in the period  of tightest credit. Before 
the discretionary  principle  of discounting  freely during  a crisis became 
an almost automatic  ritual, there was a succession of crises associated 
with the poor discretionary  performance  of the Bank. Friedman's  "too 
late  and  hence  too vigorously"  certainly  applies  much  more  to nineteenth 
century  central  banking  than  it does today.5 
In the United States, too, the gold standard  did  not bring  automaticity 
to monetary  control. Managing  the gold standard  was hard  work and, 
more  than  once, doubts  about  the United States staying  on gold created 
havoc in financial  markets.  Especially  in July 1896,  after  the adoption  of 
the free silver platform  by the Democrats, there were massive capital 
outflows  and  bullion  drainage  reducing  the U.S. Treasury  reserve  below 
the danger  point. On that occasion the monetary  system was rescued 
5. For  a discussion  see Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Jacob  Frenkel,  "The Bank  of England 
and the Crisis  of 1847,"  forthicoming  in M. Bordo  and A. Schwartz,  A Retrospective  on 
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not by monetary contraction or the conventional debt-financed  gold 
purchases  but rather  by a voluntary  exchange control board  organized 
by J. Pierpont  Morgan  and a syndicate of bankers.6  Keynes certainly 
was right in noting that "experience-an  experience covering much 
ground  and  subject  to scarcely  any  exceptions-shows  that,  when severe 
stress comes, the gold standard  is usually  suspended."7 
The case for a return to gold as a means of achieving domestic 
macroeconomic  stability is poor. A better case might  be that the gold 
standard  represents  an acceptable  way to return  to international  stability 
of exchange rates and to increased macroeconomic harmony among 
industrial  countries.  Many  of the protagonists  of the gold standard  would 
see this as one of the chief virtues of a return  of gold. But after 1925, 
1929,  and 1933,  that case too is very weak. There  is no reason  to believe 
that  countries  today are more  prepared  to live by an international  macro 
rule than they were in the 1920s  or 1930s.  The one important  difference 
is that  now we believe we know how to achieve stability,  and  it certainly 
is not by going along with the rest of the world, whatever may be 
happening  there. But it is also true that  there  is no longer  a hegemony  in 
the international  system such as the United Kingdom  had in the nine- 
teenth century. Now  a group of less-developed countries or of oil 
producers can make waves that we would want to be able to offset 
through  active management  rather  than  to be splashed  by while adhering 
to the rules of the game. 
Cooper has emphasized the difficulty, or impossibility,  of finding  a 
sensible transition  policy to a gold standard.  Any price that is too low 
leads  to an immediate  abandonment  as the U.S. Treasury  is cleaned  out, 
or else to a beginning  of managing  gold demand-transactions charges, 
bullion size,  Roosa bonds. The problem is aggravated  by a lack of 
knowledge  about  prospective monetary  demand  for gold in other coun- 
tries. If most industrial  countries moved to a gold standard,  thereby 
immobilizing  large stocks of now privately held gold, that implies one 
price. If rates remain  flexible, an entirely  different  price is warranted.  If 
large countries abandoned the gold standard, there would be world 
inflationary  pressure. If they moved onto gold, there would be world 
deflationary  pressure. Any question of the instability  of velocity in the 
6.  See Matthew Simon,  "The Hot Money Movement  and the Private Exchange  Pool 
Proposal of 1896," Journal of Economic  History, vol. 20 (March 1980), pp. 31-50. 
7.  John Maynard Keynes,  A Treatise on Money, vol. 2 (MacMillan,  1930), p. 299. 50  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
United  States is magnified  when we think  of a gold standard  because we 
certainly  lose the possibility  to easily redefine  the monetary  aggregates. 
The Gold Commission  has voted against resumption  of specie pay- 
ments and it is therefore  appropriate  to ask what should be done with 
the U.S. holdings  of monetary  gold. The United States presently owns 
about 264 million ounces of gold, which, at $275 an ounce, is worth 
nearly  $75  billion. One option  is to schedule  a series of sales, liquidating 
the inventory and using the proceeds to reduce the budget deficits or 
expand socially more productive programs than gold storage. The 
arithmetic  of such a move would certainly  be attractive  since it allows a 
sizable reduction  in the public debt outstanding  and hence in the debt 
service. 
An interesting  question arises if a $75 billion gold sale were to be 
carried  out: would interest  rates rise or fall?  Those who believe that  the 
public debt, relative to other assets, leads to high interest rates would 
think a Treasury  gold sale causes large crowding in as it reduces the 
relative supply of debt. But more properly one would have to know 
whether  gold is more nearly  the Dow Jones, Treasury  bills, or M1 in the 
minds of portfolio holders. The size of the transaction  would be suffi- 
ciently important  to make  this a serious question. 
A separate  issue is whether  the Treasury  or the Federal  Reserve has 
good reason to maintain a gold inventory and what the cost-benefit 
considerations  might  be. An argument  has been made that the Federal 
Reserve should  hold gold for possible use in exchange  market  interven- 
tion. Because gold does not now have a monetary use and because 
anything  that can be done with gold can also be done with paper, I find 
no plausible  reason  for gold hoarding  on this account.  I find  the argument 
all the more difficult  to understand  in a world in which it is not clear 
whether  dollars  and  gold  or yen and  gold  are  relatively  closer substitutes. 
One  would have to answer  that  question  before deciding  whether  to buy 
or sell gold in an attempt  to, say, appreciate  the dollar. 
Does the hoarding  of gold involve intolerable  waste in government? 
If the gold were sold and  the public  debt  reduced,  the government  would 
have lower interest burdens and the taxpayer  would have lower taxes 
matching the reduced interest payments. In portfolios, gold would 
replace  Treasury  bills, which  would  be largely  offsetting.  But  the decline 
in the real price of gold that would accompany  demonetization  would 
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redirection  of existing  resources  from  gold  digging  to alternative  activity. 
If such a reallocation  could be achieved, demonetization  clearly would 
be a gain from the social point of view. But until the stock of gold has 
been depleted by industrial  and private use, it would displace other 
assets, possibly capital,  in portfolios. 
If gold is being dismissed as a framework  for monetary  stability, are 
there  other  commodity  programs  that  are  more  promising?  One  proposal 
advanced  by Robert  Hall is a plywood standard.  Noting  that  the average 
prices of a small number  of commodities track the general price level 
fairly  well, Hall concludes that stabilizing  the price  of this bundle  would 
lead to substantial aggregate price stability. The proposal raises the 
following  question:  does the policy conflict  with Goodhart's  second law 
so that attempts to control the price of the bundle would destroy its 
correlation  with other prices?  More important,  the proposal  is certainly 
in conflict  with the Lucas critique.  The observed correlations  surely  are 
not invariant  with the monetary  regime.8 
Robert E. Hall: Cooper's paper is a carefully  researched,  fully docu- 
mented study of the history of the late nineteenth  and early twentieth 
century  gold standards  and contemporaneous  proposals  for change  and 
improvement. On the central policy question, it reaches the same 
conclusion  that every sensible modern  economist makes-the  purchas- 
ing power of gold is so unstable  that  fixing  the gold content of the dollar 
is undesirable.  Cooper's only bow in the direction  of the gold standard 
is his point that there might  be some logic in keeping a gold link if one 
were already in existence. But he is adamant  that the return  to a gold 
standard  after  so many  years on a pure  fiduciary  standard  has nothing  to 
recommend  it. 
Because the professional  consensus is so overwhelmingly  coincident 
with Cooper's judgment,  it is worth asking  why serious economists are 
interested  in the issues raised  by the gold standard.  I have two answers. 
First, as Cooper  notes, the instability  of prices  under  fiduciary  monetary 
systems invites consideration  of alternatives. The illusion that prices 
8.  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in Karl Brunner 
and Allan H. Meltzer,  eds.,  The Phillips  Curve and Labor-  Mar-kets. Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference  Series  on Public Policy,  vol.  1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1976), pp.  19- 
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were stable under the gold standard  has drawn some support to the 
resumption  of a gold link to the dollar. Cooper is effective in disposing 
of the illusion.  Second, there  is an important  recent  movement  on which 
Cooper  is silent: monetary  deregulation.  How can we stabilize  prices at 
the same time as we  grant complete freedom to banks and other 
institutions  to create money and  other  financial  instruments?  One of the 
answers is to adopt a gold definition  of the dollar. If every financial 
instrument  denominated  in dollars  is in effect a promise  to pay gold, full 
deregulation  is compatible with determinate  (but perhaps not stable) 
prices. I regret that Cooper did not pursue this aspect of the gold 
standard. 
With respect to the goal of price stability, Cooper points out that 
discretionary  policy in a fiduciary  monetary  system is perfectly  capable 
of stabilizing  prices. All we have to do is instruct  the Federal  Reserve to 
aim for a price target  and not think about anything  else. Although  that 
authority  has been accused of paying  more attention  to politics than to 
prescribed  economic goals in the past, its recent behavior shows con- 
vincingly that it can pursue a single-minded  target without regard  for 
what else is happening  in the economy. A long propaganda  siege from 
the monetarists  has convinced the Federal Reserve to look only at the 
money stock. An equal  amount  of browbeating  from economists  believ- 
ing  in price  targets  for monetary  policy might  swing  the Federal  Reserve 
to that  form  of single-mindedness.  There  is nothing  new about  the idea- 
it was pushed  hard  by Lloyd Mints  in the 1930s. 
Surprisingly, in its brief comment on  the issue  of  rules versus 
discretion, the paper does  not mention the dynamic inconsistency 
problem  pointed out by Kydland-Prescott  and others. In discretionary 
policies there is always a temptation  to create an inflationary  surprise  in 
any given year, even though  social welfare  would be greater  in the long 
run if such inflationary  surprises  were prohibited.  The answer is some 
kind of precommitment  to a policy without surprises  and a framework 
for executing policy in which nobody is exposed to the temptation  to 
create an inflationary  surprise. Again, the gold standard  is one of the 
answers  to this problem. 
Among the economists who take the need for precommitment  seri- 
ously (including myself),  there is no agreement today on the most 
desirable  form of precommitment.  The standard  answer  of the postwar 
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has cast serious doubt on the wisdom of this monetarist  prescription. 
More important,  money growth rules are in direct conflict with free- 
market  principles  that call for a noninterventionist  policy with respect 
to money-issuing  institutions. 
The bimetallic  standard  of the seventy years before the Civil War  in 
the United States is a good example of lasting precommitment;  I am 
sorry that Cooper did not include this period in his historical  review. 
The U.S. Constitution  calls for the creation of a monetary  unit in the 
same sentence as it calls for a system of weights and  measures, and  this 
is precisely what Congress did when it created the dollar  in 1792. The 
gold and silver content of the dollar  was regarded  as fixed in exactly the 
same  way as the length  of the yard.  Discretionary  changes  in the dollar's 
definition  were unthinkable.  This mentality  is precisely  what  we have in 
mind  in advocating  precommitment. 
Cooper shows that a gold definition  of the dollar  would not stabilize 
the  dollar's  purchasing  power.  Recent  experience  is not  very  encouraging 
on the desirability  of precommitting  to fixed money growth. There is 
remarkably  little agreement,  though,  on what is a good form  of precom- 
mitment.  Perhaps  the only idea  that  is going  anywhere  is that  the Federal 
Reserve  be instructed  to manipulate  its instruments  so as to keep  nominal 
GNP on a predetermined  growth  path. 
One of the most interesting parts of Cooper's paper delves into 
nineteenth  century  monetary  thought.  He notes that the thinking  of the 
nineteenth  century was behind the times because it neglected deposits 
and dealt entirely with coins and notes. But Cooper makes a similar 
mistake. A growing literature  associated with work by James Tobin, 
Fischer Black, and Eugene Fama shows that there are no important 
differences between banks and other financial intermediaries.  What 
differences  there are today are related  to regulation  and will disappear 
as deregulation  proceeds. We need to become accustomed  to discussing 
the issues of the determination  of the price level without  relying  on the 
concept of money as a special financial  instrument.  Fama  is particularly 
insistent  on conducting  the discussion without  using the term  money at 
all. 
I am so impressed  by what Cooper  put in his paper  that I have spent 
all of my time on the issues that he did not cover. I commend  this paper 
to all readers as an extraordinarily  thorough  review of the facts about 
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General Discussion 
A major focus of discussion was the comparative value of fixed 
decision rules-such  as strict adherence to a gold standard-versus 
discretionary  policymaking.  Several discussants observed that the ad- 
vent of discretionary  policy had reduced  fluctuations  in real economic 
activity. Lawrence  Summers  noted  that  financial  panics  and  consequent 
drops in real output occurred frequently under the regime of fixed 
monetary precommitments. Franco Modigliani added that the fixed 
monetary  rule under  which the Federal  Reserve currently  operates has 
resulted  in, or at least been accompanied  by, great  instability  in the real 
economy. William  Fellner, however, argued  that  episodes of discretion- 
ary policies may give rise to an unwanted  aftermath.  The aftermath  is 
attributed  to fixed-rule  policies that supplant  the discretionary  regime, 
whereas properly the blame should be attached to the discretionary 
policies  that  preceded  them.  Richard  Cooper  noted  that  the  gold  standard 
could not strictly be counted as a fixed-rule  regime in any case, as it 
permitted  considerable  discretion. Charles Holt suggested that, none- 
theless, a principal  attraction  of the gold standard  for its proponents  is 
that  it limits  the discretion  of government  authorities.  The  money supply 
is fixed by available stocks of gold and impersonal  market forces, a 
mechanism  that proponents  regard  as more reliable than government 
authorities,  who should be left only with the task of national  defense. 
Cooper agreed that there is such a philosophical  basis to the views of 
some gold standard advocates. They are willing to  accept greater 
economic instability  in return  for less government  discretion. William 
Nordhaus endorsed government sale of its present gold stock on the 
grounds  that this would remove the discretion  of future  governments  to 
go back to the gold standard. 
Stanley Fischer pointed out the practical  limitations  of government 
precommitments  such as a fixed  gold standard.  While  it may  be desirable 
to adhere  to precommitments  for some period, government  authorities 
cannot commit forever. Christopher  Sims agreed that precommitment 
is important  but suggested that real precommitment  that lasts and is 
convincing comes from policy discussion and political consensus. He 
doubted that precommitment  could be embodied in simple numerical 
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real precommitment  in the current  policy situation. Stephen Goldfeld 
noted that the real test of a commitment  is whether in some painful 
period  it is observed  or abandoned.  Policymakers  can be quite  ingenious 
in avoiding  the constraints  implied  by precommitments;  therefore  ana- 
lysts hoping  to model  policy reactions  must  focus on the political  process 
in  which  economic  policy is actually  made  and  rules  implemented.  James 
Tobin  emphasized  that it is difficult  to make some kinds of precommit- 
ment credible.  A local police force could announce  that it would refrain 
from rescuing  intrepid  mountaineers  who insisted on climbing  particu- 
larly  dangerous  peaks; but it is doubtful  that such a commitment  would 
be believed. Thus the impact of  such precommitment  is  doubtful. 
Furthermore,  it is questionable  whether,  in  the first  place, society should 
want  commitments  that it would prefer  not to honor. 
Sims noted the great difficulty in devising an optimal rule even if 
policymakers  wanted  to precommit  themselves  to one. If the form  of the 
rule matters, then in framing  it one needs models of the economy that 
are better than the ones now available. Some rational expectations 
models avoid this problem  by suggesting  that the form of the rule does 
not matter much, just  so  long as there is  a rule. But the present 
unfavorable  experience with a simple monetary  rule led Sims to reject 
that  sanguine  view. 
There was little defense of the gold standard  among  participants.  A 
few of the discussants suggested, however, that the historical  evidence 
might  not be as damning  as suggested  by Cooper.  Alan  Greenspan  noted 
that the greater variability  in prices under the gold standard  might be 
attributable  to agricultural  fluctuations  caused by variations  in weather. 
Since agriculture  predominated  in the gold standard  era while adminis- 
tered  industrial  prices  were much  more  important  in the later  period,  the 
lower  price variability  in the later  period  may be due to evolution in the 
economy's industrial  structure.  Charles  Holt concurred  with this view 
and  added  that there was only a weak commitment  in the gold standard 
era to the rules that maintain  economic stability.  In rebuttal  Modigliani 
pointed out that if one were willing to purge the gold standard  era of 
fluctuations  due to agriculture,  one should purge  the later era of price 
fluctuations  due to oil. This would show the postwar  period  to be one of 
fantastic  stability.  Walter  Salant  remarked  that  prices both fell and  rose 
for extended periods during  the gold standard  era while they had no 
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in  both  directions  might  have  helped  prevent  long-run  expectations  about 
the price  level from  becoming  biased toward  inflation,  although  this fact 
may not have been related  to the gold standard. 
Martin  Baily argued  that  a gold standard  contains  an inherent  element 
of instability.  If the government  firmly  commits  itself to maintain  a fixed 
relation  between the dollar  and  gold, and  if the commitment  is believed, 
interest-bearing  dollar  assets must be preferred,  as assets, to gold; one 
would choose to hold gold only if there were some likelihood  that the 
government  would not honor its commitment.  Hence the demand  for 
gold and its equilibrium  price must depend on how many people at a 
particular  moment  think  the government  will  go back  on its commitment. 
Robert  Hall agreed  that, with a credible  gold standard,  no gold would  be 
held by the public as a store of wealth or a monetary  reserve, and gold 
would  not change  hands  in transactions.  The relative  price  of gold would 
be determined  by the nonmonetary  demand  for gold and the supply of 
gold. 